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Abstract
Cameras mounted on Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) are increasingly used for recreational
photography and videography. However, aerial photographs and videographs of public
places often contain faces of bystanders thus leading to a perceived or actual violation of
privacy. To address this issue, this thesis presents a novel privacy filter that adaptively
blurs sensitive image regions and is robust against different privacy attacks. In particular,
the thesis aims to impede face recognition from airborne cameras and explores the design
space to determine when a face in an airborne image is inherently protected, that is when
an individual is not recognisable. When individuals are recognisable by facial recognition
algorithms, an adaptive filtering mechanism is proposed to lower the face resolution in
order to preserve privacy while ensuring a minimum reduction of the fidelity of the im-
age. Moreover, the filter’s parameters are pseudo-randomly changed to make the applied
protection robust against different privacy attacks. In case of videography, the filter is up-
dated with a motion-dependent temporal smoothing to minimise flicker introduced by the
pseudo-random switching of the filter’s parameters, without compromising on its robustness
against different privacy attacks. To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed filter, the thesis
uses a state-of-the-art face recognition algorithm and synthetically generated face data with
3D geometric image transformations that mimic faces captured from an MAV at different
heights and pitch angles. For the videography scenario, a small video face data set is first
captured and then the proposed filter is evaluated against different privacy attacks and the
quality of the resulting video using both objective measures and a subjective test.
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Introduction
Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) are becoming common platforms for a number of civilian
applications such as search and rescue [1], agriculture [2], transportation [3], news reporting
[4], environmental mapping [5] and disaster management [6]. Moreover, individuals use
MAVs equipped with high-resolution cameras for recreational photography and videography
in public places during sports activities and social gatherings [7, 8]. Such use in public places
raises privacy concerns as bystanders who happen to be within the Field of View (FV) of
the camera are captured as well. Moreover, the MAV’s operator can intentionally point the
camera’s lens wherever he/she wants (see Figure 1.1). In this thesis, operator of the MAV
is called the MAV’s owner, while bystander means any person other than the MAV’s owner,
e.g. a walking person, a vehicle-driving person, a sport-playing person or even a person
inside a house but visible through its window.
The identity of a bystander is the key to his/her perceived or actual violation of privacy
and it can be estimated from the main or quasi identifiers of the bystander as well as the
context of the videos [9, 10]. The main-identifiers are identity sources which posses unique
identifiable information of a bystander, e.g. face, ear, fingerprint and vehicle licence plate.
In contrast, the quasi-identifiers are those identity sources which contain to a degree unique
information of the bystander but not completely, e.g. age, race, gender, hair-style, type and
colour of clothes. It has been shown that such information can assist to infer the identity
of the bystander [10]. The context means location and time information that are estimated
from the background of the captured videos. In this thesis, image-regions corresponding to
the main-identifiers and the quasi-identifiers are called sensitive-regions. In order to preserve
privacy of a bystander, these sensitive-regions are usually protected by removing, replacing
1
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Figure 1.1: A privacy-violating scenario in an airborne-recreational videography. A camera-
equipped MAV is allowed in a public place, e.g. a park, and a person (rightmost) is flying
such an MAV for a recreational purpose. Although the objective of the MAV is to capture
operator’s video, it can also collect private information of bystanders intentionally or unin-
tentionally, both inside and outside of the park area. Consequently, this can violate privacy
of the bystanders.
or sufficiently distorting the sensitive-regions using algorithms called privacy filters [11–
13]. On the other hand, the context is protected by restricting the cameras from certain
locations, removing the background of the videos or just distorting it [14–16].
Unlike several applications of surveillance imagery such as people counting, perimeter pro-
tection and behaviour analysis whose utility is not compromised by a full redaction of the
sensitive-regions and context [17], recreational videos require a minimal distortion of the
image content in order to be usable. For these videos, the utility can be defined as the
fidelity (i.e. image quality) of the protected images with respect to the originally captured
images. In addition, recreational videos require automatic and robust protection of the
sensitive-regions preferably on-board the MAVs as the MAV’s owner cannot be ensured to
be a legitimate individual, i.e. a privacy law abiding person. Automatic protection means
without any involvement of the MAV’s owner, while robust protection means the protected
sensitive-region is not recognisable by various attacks, e.g. brute-force, na¨ıve, parrot and
reconstruction attacks [12, 13, 18–22]. A brute-force attack tries to decipher the protected
probe images (i.e. sensitive-regions) by an exhaustive search [19, 20]. Other attacks use
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gallery images in addition to the protected probe images [12, 13, 21, 22]. In a na¨ıve attack,
the protected probe images are compared against the unprotected gallery images [12, 13, 21].
In a parrot attack, the attacker has knowledge about the privacy filter and can transform the
gallery images into the distorted domain [12]. In a reconstruction attack, the attacker has
some knowledge of how to (partially) reconstruct the probe image from the protected to the
unprotected domain [18]. Examples of reconstruction methods include Inverse Filter (IF)
[18] and Super-resolution (SR) [22].
Thus, a privacy filter for an airborne-recreational videography should satisfy the following
properties: (a) introduce only a minimal spatio-temporal distortion; (b) be robust against
attacks; and (c) be computationally efficient. Minimal spatio-temporal distortion is nec-
essary not to divert the attention of a viewer. Robustness is important to avoid privacy
violations by various attacks, e.g. brute-force, na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction attacks.
Finally, computational efficiency is desirable when the filter operates using the limited com-
putational and battery power of an MAV.
1.1 Motivation and Objective
The motivation of this thesis is to develop a robust privacy filter for the main-identifiers of
bystanders captured in recreational videos. The main-identifiers are the key identifiers and
should be protected first compared to quasi-identifiers and context. The thesis considers
the application of airborne-recreational videography using an MAV in a public place. This
motivation requires an investigation of the existing privacy filters intended for the main-
identifiers especially those developed for the video surveillance, i.e. Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV). Thus, we first survey the existing privacy filters in a larger domain of videography
and then focus on the privacy filters for airborne-recreational videography.
In general, privacy filters can be fixed or adaptable. Fixed privacy filters remove sensitive-
regions in images or replace them with a de-identified representation. Examples of fixed
privacy filters include masking (blanking) [15, 23] and replacing regions representing people
with silhouettes or avatars [24–27]. Adaptable privacy filters can be configured depending
on privacy and fidelity of the targets. Basically, an adaptable privacy filter can be static
or dynamic. Static adaptable filters keep their parameters, such as the standard deviation
of Gaussian blur, spatially and temporally fixed [28, 29]. Examples of static adaptable
privacy filters include pixelation [26], Gaussian blur [28] and cartooning [21]. These filters
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protect against a na¨ıve attack, but are prone to parrot [12] and reconstruction attacks.
Dynamic adaptable filters protect sensitive-regions against parrot and reconstruction attacks
by changing spatially and temporally their parameters [20, 30], e.g. scrambling [31] and
warping [30]. However, these filters introduce flicker as the parameters are temporally
uncorrelated.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no dynamic adaptive privacy filter that is designed to
reduce flicker and this is first time that flicker reduction is considered in this thesis. Flicker-
reduction approaches, which were developed for video compression [32–37], can be classified
as prior, during or post encoding [34, 35]. The prior [38] and during encoding [33–35]
approaches are designed for a specific coder. Post encoding approaches are instead generic
and measure the spatio-temporal correlation between frames [32, 36, 37]. However, this
correlation is broken by privacy filters such as scrambling [20] and warping [30]. Therefore
an alternative approach for minimising flicker is required for a dynamic adaptive privacy
filter.
In particular, privacy filters for aerial videography need to face additional challenges caused
by the ego-motion of the camera, changing illumination conditions, and variable sensitive-
region orientation and resolution. Recent privacy filters for airborne cameras are based on
geo-fencing, Generic Data Encryption (GDE) [39] and Unmanned Aircraft Systems-Visual
Privacy Guard (UAS-VPG) [4]. In geo-fencing, an MAV avoids to fly over a private prop-
erty whose co-ordinates could be embedded in the MAV’s navigation software (e.g. the
community-generated database NoFlyZone [14]) in order to not violate an individual’s pri-
vacy. Alternatively, in GDE, the MAV first sends encrypted data to a privacy server that
blanks, blurs or mosaics sensitive-regions and then transfers to an end user. Contrary to
server-based filtering, UAS-VPG [4] is aimed for on-board implementation and focusses on
face detection in order to Gaussian blur. However, it does not investigate the required
Gaussian blur. In fact, faces from airborne cameras can be captured from various angles
and distances, thus resulting in a high variation of face orientations and resolutions. If these
faces are protected through a fixed Gaussian blur, it can severely degrade the fidelity of the
images. Moreover, Gaussian blur as used by both GDE and UAS-VPG is prone to parrot
[12] and reconstruction attacks.
In this thesis, we present a privacy-preserving framework for on-board adaptive protection
of main-identifiers captured from airborne cameras. Particularly, the two main objectives
of this framework are: (i) exploration of Privacy Design Space (PDS) for a given main-
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identifier and (ii) its robust protection with minimal spatio-temporal distortion. Although
the study and the findings of this thesis are equally applicable to the other main-identifiers,
we only consider face of a bystander as it is the most important and well-studied identity
source [10, 12, 13, 21, 40–42].
In the first part, the framework employs the existing adaptive privacy filters and explores
the PDS for a face. The PDS means a region of the 3D world in which a face is recognis-
able. We define a mechanism that allows us to automatically configure an adaptive privacy
filter. The mechanism uses the resolution of the detected face to determine when it is inher-
ently protected. We use the auxiliary data from the on-board navigation sensors (Global
Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)) to determine when a
face is not inherently protected and then apply an adaptive privacy filter that distorts a
sensitive-region depending upon its captured resolution.
In the second part, the framework is updated with a novel privacy filter called Adaptive
Hoping Gaussian Mixture Model (AHGMM) that improves the trade-off between privacy,
fidelity and temporal smoothness. In general, the proposed filter distorts a face with secret
parameters to be robust to na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction attacks. The distortion is
minimal and adaptive to the resolution of the captured face: we select the smallest Gaussian
kernel that reduces the face resolution below a certain threshold. The selected threshold
protects the face against the na¨ıve attack as well as maintains its resolution at a specified
level. To prevent other attacks, we then insert supplementary Gaussian kernels in the
selected Gaussian kernel and hop their parameters locally using a Pseudo-random Number
Generator (PRNG) so their estimation is difficult from the filtered face image. Specifically
for the videography, hopping of the Gaussian kernels generate flicker just like state-of-the-art
scrambling and warping filters. In order to minimise flicker, hopping Gaussian kernels are
temporally concatenated with a motion-dependent temporal smoothing filter. In particular,
depending on the resolution of the captured face, the parameters of an AHGMM filter are
adjusted according to the target spatial distortion and are then temporally averaged with
decaying weights to minimise flicker. This minimises spatio-temporal distortions and is
robust against na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction attacks.
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Parrot-SR
Protector
Attacker
Protector
Attacker
Figure 1.2: Attack model of a privacy-preserving system.
1.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we discuss the privacy attack model for a protected face and the possible
attacks on it. Moreover, we state the performance measures for identity and spatio-temporal
distortion for the protected face. Finally, we define the problem of the thesis work.
1.2.1 Privacy Attack Model
Let D = {Rk}Kk=1 be a set with face data of K subjects, where k represents the identity
information (labels). Let each subject k be represented by at most Y images, i.e. Rk =
{Ri|i ≤ Y }. Let RG ,RP ⊂ D be the face gallery and face probe data sets, respectively,
where RG ∩RP = ∅ and usually |RG | > |RP |, and |.| is the cardinality of a set.
Let FΩj : RP → R¯P represent a privacy filter of selected parameter Ωj . The privacy filter
FΩj distorts the features of RP to produce a protected probe data set R¯P such that the
probability P of predicting its correct labels K = {kl}|RP |l=1 decreases, where l represents the
image number of RP and as a result introduce distortion D in each protected face. Let
E : R¯P → K˜ = {k˜l}|R¯P |l=1 indicate an attacker whose aim is to correctly predict labels K˜ of R¯P
(see Figure 1.2). In this work, we assume that an attacker has access to B ∈ {RG , R¯G , RˆG},
where R¯G is the filtered gallery data set and RˆG is the filtered and reconstructed gallery
data set.
An attacker could modify R¯P , RG or both to correctly predict K˜ of R¯P (see Figure 1.3). In
a traditional na¨ıve attack (here referred to as na¨ıve-T attack), a privacy filter is applied on
RP to generate a protected probe data set R¯P , while the unaltered RG is used for training
[12]. A traditional parrot attack (here referred to as parrot-T attack), learns the privacy
filter type and its parameters Ωj (e.g. Gaussian blur of certain standard deviation used to
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Figure 1.3: Privacy Attacks to predict label k˜: (a) Na¨ıve-T, (b) Parrot-T and (c) Na¨ıve-SR
and (d) Parrot-SR.
generate R¯P). Then, the learned filter is applied on RG to generate a privacy protected
gallery data set R¯G . Finally, R¯G and R¯P are used for training and testing, respectively [12].
In a reconstruction attack, the discriminating features of R¯P are first restored (e.g. using
an inverse filter or a super-resolution algorithm) to generate a reconstructed probe data set
RˆP and then compared against RG or a reconstructed gallery data set RˆG . An inverse filter
first estimates the parameters of a privacy filter using R¯P and then performs an inverse
operation to reconstruct the original faces [18]. Similarly, a super-resolution algorithm
first learns embeddings between the high-resolution and their corresponding low-resolution
faces and then reconstructs the high-resolution faces for R¯P [22]. When such super-resolved
faces are compared againstRG and RˆG , the attack is referred to as Na¨ıve-SR and Parrot-SR,
respectively.
1.2.2 Distortion and Identity Level
A privacy filter FΩj generates a spatial as well as a temporal distortion. Let the spatial
distortion level generated by FΩj be measured using the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR)
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which is given by
PSNR = 20 log10
(Rmax√
∆R
)
, (1.1)
where Rmax is the maximum possible pixel intensity and ∆R is the mean square error
between the pixel intensities of an unprotected face Rt ∈ RP captured at time t and a
protected face R¯t ∈ R¯P given as
∆R =
1
|RP |WH
|RP |∑
r=1
W∑
w=1
H∑
h=1
|Rt(w, h)− R¯t(w, h)|2r , (1.2)
where W and H are width and height of Rt, respectively.
Let the temporal distortion level generated by FΩj be measured by the maximum of absolute
difference ξ of pixel intensities [43] given by
ξ =
W∑
w=1
H∑
h=1
ξ(w, h), (1.3)
where
ξ(w, h) = max
(
0, |R¯t(w, h)− R¯t−1(w, h)| − |Rt(w, h)−Rt−1(w, h)|
)
. (1.4)
where Rt(w, h) (R¯t(w, h)) and Rt−1(w, h) (R¯t−1(w, h)) are the unprotected (filtered) pixel
intensity values from the current and previous frame, respectively.
As there are face recognisers with different recognition capability that an attacker can
exploit, it is therefore required to validate FΩj using the state-of-the-art face recogniser
for the generated spatio-temporal distortion. Let the identity level of a bystander be an
accuracy η ∈ {ηv, ηi} of a face recogniser, which is calculated depending upon the type of
the system, e.g. Equal Error Rate (EER) accuracy ηv for a verification system or cumulative
Rank-n accuracy ηi for an identification system. In case of a verification system, ηv is given
as
ηv =
TP + TN
|RP | , (1.5)
where TP and TN are true positives and true negatives, respectively. In case of an identi-
fication system, ηi is defined as
ηi =
N∑
n=1
(
1
KT
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
xkt
)
n
, (1.6)
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where N is the identification rank, K is the number of subjects, T is the number of frames
in a video, and
xkt =
1 if k = k˜0 otherwise. (1.7)
where k and k˜ are the true and predicted labels, respectively.
Let us consider as baseline for comparison a random classifier’s accuracy  ∈ {v, i}. For
face verification, the random classifier’s accuracy v = 0.5, while for face identification, a
random classifier’s accuracy i = 1/K. When the face recogniser achieves a performance
similar to that of a random classifier, the identity level is considered lowest. If the recogniser
performance improves, the identity level increases. Thus, the goal of a privacy filter is to
make it harder/impossible for a face recogniser to correctly verify or identify a face or in
other words making its accuracy similar to a random classifier.
1.2.3 Problem Statement
The core objective of the thesis work is first to determine whether a captured main-identifier
is inherently protected or not. If not, developing a privacy filter with the following two
competing targets: The first target is that a face should be robustly protected against
attacks, i.e. η →  for a protected face under the na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction attacks.
The second concurrent and competing target is that the face should be protected with
a minimal spatio-temporal distortion, i.e. high PSNR and low ξ, without affecting the
validity of η → .
1.3 Research Questions
The thesis addresses the following key scientific questions to protect privacy of the by-
standers in recreational videography:
• What is privacy design space for adaptive filtering?
A camera equipped MAV can manoeuvre in a large space, e.g. up to 150 m in Austria
and as a result, could capture a main-identifier from different heights and pitch angles.
It could happen that the sensitive-region (i.e. captured main-identifier) is inherently
protected due to low resolution or high pitch angle and does not require any privacy
filtering. Thus, the MAV should automatically determine whether a sensitive-region
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is protected or not. If not, it should adapt the parameters of a privacy filter to the
resolution of the sensitive-region in order to maintain high fidelity.
• How to robustly protect a sensitive-region without relying on sophisticated detectors?
A sophisticated detector means any computer vision algorithm other than the object
detection algorithm, e.g. pose, age, race, gender detectors are termed as sophisti-
cated detectors when used along with a face detector. An adaptive privacy filter,
e.g. Gaussian blur is prone to the parrot and the reconstruction attacks, while, in
order to protect against such attacks, a non-adaptive privacy filter, e.g. k-Same-Select
[44], k-Same-M [40], and Gender Age Race Protector (GARP) [41] require all the
k-sensitive-regions to be at the same pose. Finding the exact pose of a main-identifier
from its given sensitive-region in airborne videography could be challenging due to
illumination conditions and variable resolutions. Thus, it is required to develop a
robust privacy filter that does not depend on any sophisticated detector.
• How to minimise spatio-temporal distortion in privacy-preserving airborne videogra-
phy?
An MAV can capture a main-identifier with variable resolution and pitch angle in
a video. Applying an adaptive privacy filter with constant parameters could reduce
fidelity as the pitch angle or height of the camera increases or simply the resolution
of the sensitive-region decreases. In addition, the switching of the parameters for
different frames of a video generates flicker, e.g. as in scrambling [20] and warping
[30]. This generates unpleasant effect and can also divert a viewer’s attention. Thus,
it is required to adapt the parameters of a filter depending on the resolution of the
sensitive-region without creating any temporal distortion. Moreover, the parameter
adaptation should not affect robustness against different attacks.
1.4 Contributions
The key contributions of the thesis are:
• Privacy design space for adaptive filtering: Design and development of a mechanism
to determine whether a sensitive-region is inherently protected or not and if not,
adaptively selecting the filter parameters to minimise distortion. The mechanism is
based on the pixel density (i.e. number of pixels per unit distance) of a sensitive-region
and a pre-defined threshold. The pixel density is estimated using the height, tilt angle
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and image-sensor dimensions of the camera, while the threshold is experimentally
calculated for a state-of-the-art recognition algorithm, e.g. a face recogniser for a
captured face. When the sensitive-region is recognisable in the image/video, the
estimated pixel density also assists in optimally configuring an adaptive privacy filter
to protect the sensitive-region with a minimal distortion. The salient feature of the
optimal configuration is that it provides privacy equivalent to blanking out (only
against a na¨ıve attack) but much higher fidelity compared to fixed filtering or blanking
out. Deliverables:
O. Sarwar, B. Rinner, and A. Cavallaro. Design space exploration for adaptive privacy
protection in airborne images. In Proc. IEEE Advanced Video and Signal-based
Surveillance (AVSS), pages 159-165. Colorado Springs, USA, August 2016.
• Adaptive Hopping Gaussian Mixture Model (AHGMM): Design and development of
a novel privacy filter that robustly protects a sensitive-region against brute force,
na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction attacks, and at the same time minimises spatio-
temporal distortion. The salient features of AHGMM are: (1) It does not rely on
any sophisticated detector for robust protection in contrast to non-adaptive privacy
filters: k-Same-Select [44], k-Same-M [40], k-Same-Furthest [45], k-Same-Net [46] and
GARP [41]. (2) Like adaptive privacy filters (Space Variant Gaussian Blur (SVGB)
[47], Optimal Distortion-Based Visual Protector (ODBVP) [13], Cartooning [21]), the
AHGMM can adaptively be configured for a better trade-off between fidelity and pri-
vacy protection. However, unlike these adaptive privacy filters, protection of AHGMM
is robust against parrot and reconstruction attacks. (3) Finally, compared to dynamic
adaptive privacy filters (scrambling [20, 48–51] and warping [30]), the AHGMM min-
imises flicker by temporally correlating its parameters without compromising on ro-
bustness. Deliverables:
O. Sarwar, A. Cavallaro, and B. Rinner. Temporally smooth privacy protected air-
borne videos. In Proc. IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots (IROS),
Madrid, Spain, October 2018.
O. Sarwar, B. Rinner, and A. Cavallaro. Concealing the identity of faces in oblique
images with adaptive hopping Gaussian mixtures, International Journal of Computer
Vision (IJCV), Springer (planned, preprint at http://arxiv.org/abs/1810.12435).
• Face data sets: Generation of a synthetic face image data set (see Appendix A) and
collection of a face video data set (see Section 5.2.1). To the best of our knowledge,
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there is no publically available face image data set with a large population size or a
face video data set even with a small population size captured from an MAV. In this
thesis, we synthetically generate a face image data set of 480,000 images belonging to
4281 subjects which emulates faces as captured from an MAV at different heights and
pitch angles. In addition, we collect a small face video data set of 11 subjects from
two different heights (4 m and 7 m) with a pitch angle variation of 20◦ - 78◦, which
shows faces of moving subjects as captured from an MAV. Deliverables:
Airborne face image data set (Appendix A) and airborne face video data set (Section
5.2.1).
1.5 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organised as:
Chapter 2 first describes the privacy definition used in the visual data and then critically
reviews the state-of-the-art privacy filters, including both airborne and CCTV cameras.
Specifically for the human faces, it states the recognition requirements for humans as well
as machine algorithms. In the end, it summaries the state-of-the-art privacy filters by
highlighting the research gaps.
Chapter 3 presents the concept of PDS exploration. Moreover, when operating inside the
explored PSD, it describes how an adaptive filter could be optimally configured to increase
fidelity without compromising on privacy. It experimentally supports and validates optimal
configuration using a Gaussian blur.
Chapter 4 presents a novel privacy filter based on hopping kernels to improve the trade-
off between privacy, fidelity and flicker. In particular, the chapter describes the concept
of hopping kernels and how to generate them for a given sensitive-region such that it is
robustly protected with a minimum spatial distortion. Moreover, the chapter gives the
details of spatio-temporal post-processing aimed for seamless spatial protection and reduced
temporal distortion. In the end, it presents the analytical analysis of the computational
complexity of the proposed filter.
Chapter 5 discusses the experimental results of the proposed filter for airborne photogra-
phy and videography by exploiting a synthetic and a real face data sets, respectively. The
chapter assumes different knowledge levels of an attacker for the parrot and the reconstruc-
tion attacks and thoroughly investigates privacy. For the reconstruction attacks, it uses
Chapter 1: Introduction 13
an inverse filter and a state-of-the-art super-resolution algorithm. Moreover, it quantifies
the corresponding fidelity and flicker. In the end, it presents the trade-off analysis between
privacy and fidelity for a photography scenario, and between privacy, fidelity and flicker for
a videography scenario.
Chapter 6 finally concludes the thesis by summarising the key contributions, highlighting
the limitations and elaborating the future research directions.
Chapter 2
State of the Art
Privacy protection in airborne cameras is a contemporary research area with only a few
frameworks mostly based on access control. However, privacy protection methods developed
over the last two decades for ground cameras, i.e. CCTV could prove useful for airborne
cameras. A direct application of these methods on airborne cameras can be insufficient as
airborne cameras introduce additional privacy challenges of mobility and viewing angles.
Therefore, this chapter discusses privacy-preserving filters proposed for both CCTV and
airborne cameras, and then highlights their limitations.
First, this chapter discusses the definition of privacy and utility used in the literature of
visual data and describes their important aspects for recreational videography. Second, it
formally defines a privacy filter and critically reviews privacy filters proposed for both CCTV
and airborne cameras, highlighting whether these filters preserve privacy and maintain
utility according to their stated definitions or not. At the end of the review process, it
elaborates the limitations of the existing state-of-the-art to protect privacy in airborne
cameras and states the differences of the proposed work. Specifically, considering face as a
main-identifier, it discusses the face recognition requirements for both humans and machine
algorithms. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting a summary.
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2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 K-anonymity
A k-anonymity algorithm takes the k-attributes (e.g. faces) belonging to k-individuals of
a data set and replaces them with a single attribute, ensuring that the attribute is not
recognised with a probability greater than 1/k. Increasing the value of k improves privacy
protection, but reduces the discriminability of the data that may limit its usefulness. Ex-
amples of k-anonymity algorithms for face data sets are k-Same [12], k-Same-Select [44],
k-Same-M [40]. In contrast to k-anonymity, anonymisation, in general, can also be achieved
through ad-hoc algorithms, e.g. blurring [28], pixelation [26] and cartooning [21], which
distort the faces to impede their recognition. Through the parameters of these algorithms,
different levels of anonymisation can be ensured.
2.1.2 Differential Privacy
Both k-anonymity and ad-hoc algorithms ensure protection within a given data set captured
under a certain context. However, when two such anonymised data sets with a minimum
difference are compared, individuals can be recognised with high probability [52]. To protect
such identity leakage, differential privacy algorithms [53, 54] are proposed which reduce the
difference between the two anonymised data sets, thus providing differentially protected
data sets. In this thesis, we focus on a single data set of bystanders’ faces; therefore, we do
not consider differential privacy protection.
2.1.3 Privacy Loss
There are different definitions of privacy loss as it is a subjective issue [10, 15, 55]. In this
thesis, privacy loss L is defined as a probabilistic variable [9, 10] given as
L = I.S, (2.1)
where I ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of identifying a bystander using any possible source
(e.g. face, vehicle licence plate, age, race, location and time) and S ∈ [0, 1] represents
the sensitivity index of an activity (i.e. an amount of personal information in the activity
as perceived by the bystander and 1 being highly sensitive). This activity could be any
personal habit, e.g. smoking, playing any sport or presence at some location.
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Identity is an objective entity in L and can be estimated using main-identifiers (i.e. face,
ear, fingerprint, vehicle licence plate), quasi-identifiers (i.e. age, race, gender, hair-style,
type and colour of clothes) and context (i.e. position and time) [10]. If Im, Iq and Ic are the
identity probabilities estimated through the main-identifiers, quasi-identifies and context,
respectively, then I is given by
I = νmIm + νqIq + νcIc, (2.2)
where 0 ≤ νm, νq, νc ≤ 1 are weighting factors such that νm + νq + νc = 1. An attacker
can adaptively select νm, νq, νc to maximise I depending on the number of bystanders in a
public place and their gender, age, race, colour and types of clothes.
In contrast to identity, the sensitivity index is a subjective entity [15], which depends on
the bystander, his/her cultural background, religious values [55] and age [9]. Moreover,
the sensitivity index of an information also depends on its context [55]. For example, an
information might not be sensitive in one context (home), but highly sensitive in another
context (work). A bystander may also grade the same activity differently during his/her
teenage, young age and old age. Let At,∆t be an activity starting from time t for ∆t duration
and possesses certain personal information. The sensitivity index of At,∆t is given by
S = O(At,∆t), (2.3)
where O is a subjective operator which grades At,∆t depending upon the amount of personal
information.
In order to minimise L, either I or S has to be reduced. In this thesis, we only reduce
I due to its objective nature compared to subjective S. In particular, we reduce Im as
it carries more importance in comparison to Iq and Ic, especially when the number of
bystanders increases in a public place. We measure and validate Im using Eq. 1.5 or Eq.
1.6 considering only faces as main-identifier.
2.1.4 Utility
When a privacy filter is applied to protect the main-identifiers, quasi-identifiers or context,
it introduces a distortion which may limit the use of the protected images and videos. As a
result, there could be a trade-off between privacy loss and utility of the images and videos.
In fact, utility refers to the usefulness of the privacy-protected images and videos, and can
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be stated depending upon the application. For example, in an application that requires
only detection or tracking of human faces and not their recognition, utility can be defined
as the accuracy of a detection or tracking algorithm [42]. Similarly, in an application
(e.g. recreational videography) where the visual quality of the protected image is more
important, utility can be defined as fidelity [21, 56]. Although the quasi-identifiers can help
in inferring the identity of bystanders, they can also represent utility in some applications,
especially where the population size is large and accurate estimation of the quasi-identifiers
does not contribute too much in identifying bystanders. For example, it may be required
to differentiate the faces based on age, race or gender in a large face data set while still
thwarting their recognition [41].
In this thesis, we consider the application of recreational videography using an MAV; there-
fore utility is defined as the fidelity (measured using Eq. 1.1) of the protected videos as well
as their flicker level (i.e. temporal distortion level measured using Eq. 1.3).
2.1.5 Privacy Filter
A privacy filter is either an arrangement of optics of a camera or a computer vision al-
gorithm that modifies the appearance of critical-areas of an image such that the under-
lying identity or activity is difficult to recognise by machine algorithms or humans. The
critical-areas can be either sensitive-regions that represent the captured main-identifiers,
quasi-identifiers or background that shows the captured context. A privacy filter can be
applied either during the image capturing stage (pre-processing) or after capturing the im-
age (post-processing). In addition, a privacy filter can be either reversible or irreversible
[9, 57]. A reversible privacy filter can recover back the original critical-areas without any
loss, while an irreversible privacy filter cannot fully recover back the original critical-areas.
Moreover, a privacy filter can be either adaptive or non-adaptive [13, 21]. An adaptive
privacy filter can control the distortion strength while protecting a critical-area, while a
non-adaptive privacy filter cannot control the distortion strength. Finally, a privacy filter
can be manual, semi-autonomous or autonomous: in a manual privacy filter, a bystander
is himself/herself responsible for his/her privacy protection without camera involvement;
in a semi-autonomous privacy filter, the bystander interacts with the camera and directs
the camera to protect privacy; in an autonomous privacy filter, the camera itself finds and
protects the bystander. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the state-of-the-art privacy filters.
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2.2 Pre-processing Privacy Filters
Pre-processing privacy filters prevent a camera to capture main-identifiers, quasi-identifiers
or even context during the image acquisition. These privacy filters can be divided into
sensitive-region and context-oriented filters. Both state-of-the-art sensitive-region and context-
oriented filters are irreversible and non-adaptive.
2.2.1 Sensitive-Region Privacy Filters
Sensitive-region pre-processing privacy filters only protect the visual details of the main-
identifiers or quasi-identifiers during image acquisition phase. This protection can be en-
abled by interacting with a camera through either its software or hardware. Based on the
type of interaction between the bystander and the camera, sensitive-region pre-processing
privacy filters can further be divided into manual, semi-autonomous and autonomous cate-
gories.
A manual sensitive-region privacy filter usually protects main-identifiers or quasi-identifiers
by forcefully saturating the camera sensor; therefore the responsibility of privacy protection
relies on the bystander. For example, in flash photography, Eagle Eye [58] uses a light
detector to locate a camera and then bursts intense light on it. Similarly, BlindSpot [59]
blocks the cameras, but it does not rely on flash detection. Rather, it actively searches
for retro-reflective Charge Coupled Device (CCD) or Complementary Metal Oxide Semi-
conductor (CMOS) camera lenses using Infra-red (IR) illuminators. Both Eagle Eye and
BlindSpot non-adaptively distort almost the complete image which significantly reduces the
fidelity. On the contrary, Privacy Visor [60] is specifically designed for face protection and
only distorts the sensitive-region (i.e. captured face). It consists of a pair of glasses equipped
with Near Infra-red (NIR) Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs). These LEDs continuously emit
invisible light which saturates the image sensor that tries to capture the face. In contrast
to Privacy Visor, LiShield [61] uses a specialised pulsating LEDs to protect the face from
attackers, but it allows the authenticated users to capture it by sharing the pulsating pat-
tern through wireless communication. Due to the pulsating nature of the LEDs, LiShield
only corrupts different sub-regions of the captured face. However, faces protected by both
Privacy Visor and LiShield still remain recognisable for humans.
The motivation of semi-autonomous sensitive-region privacy filters is to disable the cam-
eras or notify about photography prohibition through wireless communications, e.g. Blue-
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tooth [62], Wi-Fi [39] and IR [63]. Both Bluetooth [62, 100] and Wi-Fi [39] based approaches
use standard communication protocols and therefore require special software installation on
the camera to control it. Thus, these approaches completely rely on the integrity of the
camera owner. In contrast, an IR-based approach [63] controls the camera through a dedi-
cated IR-receiver that is fabricated within the camera. In this approach, a main-identifier
encodes its privacy policy in the IR signal which is transmitted and finally decoded by the
camera’s IR-receiver to switch it on or off. Due to communication constraints, these privacy
filters are only suitable for a short range.
An autonomous sensitive-region privacy filter does not require any involvement of the by-
stander, and autonomously first detects and then protects his/her main-identifiers at the
image sensor level. For example, the “anonymous camera” is fully autonomous and consists
of an IR sensor and a CCD sensor along with a Spatial Light Modulator (SLM) placed in
front of it [64]. The camera detects the face using the IR sensor and then projects it on
the SLM, which optically blanks out the face for the image captured by the CCD sensor
(see Figure 2.1). Recently, a prototype of pre-processing k-anonymity is developed that
optically k-anonymises a face [65]. However, it first requires to find the exact pose of the
face and then requires the k − 1 faces at the same pose.
In contrast to the anonymous camera, the courteous-wearable camera developed by Mi-
crosoft fabricates a Far Infra-red (FIR) image sensor with an RGB image sensor to au-
tonomously control the RGB image sensor without using any SLM [66]. Initially, the RGB
sensor is kept off and only the FIR image sensor captures and analyses the environment
using computer vision algorithms. If it does not find any privacy violation, the FIR image
sensor switches on the RGB sensor; otherwise, the RGB image sensor remains off. The
motivation of the FIR image sensor to control the RGB sensor is its low quality which is
less privacy invading but sufficient to sense the environment. In the same stream, the Pri-
vacEye wearable camera uses two RGB sensors: one controlling sensor and second recording
sensor [67]. The controlling sensor is placed close to the human eye which analyses the eye
movements to control the shutter of the recording sensor. It is argued that eye movements
are related to private clues and therefore could be used to preserve the privacy. However,
such protection mechanisms only allow capturing a video at irregular intervals.
Chapter 2: State of the Art 21
  
CCD
SLM
Mask
Scene
Protected Scene
Mirror
Thermal Image
IR sensor
Figure 2.1: An autonomous sensitive-region pre-processing privacy protection filter. A
sensitive-region (i.e. face) region is first detected using an IR sensor which is then projected
on the SLM sensor, placed in front of the CCD sensor. The SLM sensor blocks the light
rays corresponding to the detected face region from falling on the CCD sensor. Thus, the
face region is blanked out on the CCD sensor. This figure is an adaptation from [64].
2.2.2 Context-Oriented Privacy Filters
Context-oriented pre-processing privacy filters protect the background (i.e. captured con-
text) of the images and videos. The background contains the location and time information
which could be exploited to infer the identity of a bystander, even when his/her main-
identifiers or quasi-identifiers are unrecognisable [9, 47]. These filters are usually aimed
to protect the private spaces, e.g. backyard of a home or view of a room as seen through
its glass window. Particularity for airborne cameras, the context-oriented pre-processing
privacy filters are based on the idea of restricting the MAVs from accessing the private
spaces either indefinitely or for a specified time. These filters are irreversible and can be
categorised as semi-autonomous and autonomous privacy filters.
Autonomous context-oriented privacy filters automatically detect the private spaces and
protect them without any real-time involvement from the owner of the context, i.e. no real-
time request to protect his/her context. For example, NoFlyZone [14] encloses a database of
restricted areas in the navigation software of an MAV and avoids these restricted areas while
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planning the MAV’s route. A practical implementation of this is a B4UFLY app developed
by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to assist drone pilots. However, such context-
oriented pre-processing privacy filters are insufficient to protect privacy, especially when
hovering near the residential areas. For example, consider an MAV flying in an allowed
region (public park) with adjacent NoFlyZone area (home), but pointing its lens in the
NoFlyZone property.
Contrary to property restrictions, it is also suggested to put restrictions on just altitudes
irrespective of the horizontal location to prevent high-resolution images [70]. In particular,
it is advocated to extend landowner’s airspace right in the United States up to 350 ft
(currently 83 ft), just 50 ft below the maximum allowed altitude (400 ft) for the commercial
MAVs [70]. The rest of 50 ft spatial window (350-400 ft) is dedicated for the transportation
of commercial MAVs. However, restrictions on just height can leak privacy, e.g. using a
high-resolution camera/optics.
Semi-autonomous context-oriented privacy filters protect the context by incorporating context-
owner-defined privacy policies that are directly communicated to the MAV. For example,
Mind-your-(R,φ) advertises privacy policies associated with a private property through a
WAP-beacon over a Wi-Fi link [71] (See Figure 2.2). An MAV approaching a private prop-
erty listens to the beacon signal and determines whether it is allowed to use the in-coming
private space or not. If allowed, it decodes additional constraints: height, time, noise level
and sensors. Finally, based on these constraints, it updates its route and heads towards its
destination. Like an autonomous context-oriented privacy filter, this approach is also not
suitable in case of oblique optics.
2.3 Post-processing Privacy Filters
Post-processing privacy filters protect critical-areas (i.e. captured main-identifiers, quasi-
identifiers and context) after image acquisition. All post-processing privacy filters are au-
tonomous, i.e. they do not require any interaction from bystanders. These privacy filters,
like pre-processing privacy filters, can be divided into sensitive-region and context-oriented
categories.
Chapter 2: State of the Art 23
  
  Private 
space
Destination
Planned route
Actual route
Source
10 m
20 m
30 m
40 m
50 m
Figure 2.2: A real time property-restricted privacy protection approach. An MAV is re-
quired to fly from a source to a destination location, but a private property is located in the
direct shortest path. When the MAV approaches the private property, it listens a WAP-
beacon signal broadcasted by the private property. After decoding the signal, MAV finds
that it is not allowed to traverse the private property at the moment and therefore reroutes
its path. This figure is an adaptation from [71].
2.3.1 Sensitive-Region Privacy Filters
Sensitive-region post-processing privacy filters protect the sensitive-regions (i.e. captured
main-identifiers or quasi-identifiers) in the images and videos using computer vision algo-
rithms. These privacy filters can be further divided into reversible and irreversible filters.
Reversible privacy filters: These filters use a private key to protect the sensitive-
regions, which is later used to recover back the original sensitive-regions if required. These
filters can be either adaptive or non-adaptive.
Adaptive reversible filters protect the sensitive-region with a controllable distortion which
can be fully removed with the secret key. Examples of adaptive reversible filters are scram-
bling [20, 31, 48, 72–74], warping [30] and morphing [76].
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Privacy protection through invertible cryptographic obscuration. Although the
visual distortion can be fully removed, it leaves a sensitive-region (e.g. a captured face)
incomprehensible when protected.
Scrambling can be used in space, frequency or code-stream domain [9]. The main advantage
of the space domain scrambling is its simplicity and independency of the used compression
algorithm [74, 75]. However, space domain scrambling increases the bit rate as it changes the
data statistics significantly. Contrary to the space domain, a huge amount of work exists for
transform domain scrambling. Examples of transform domain scrambling are: permuting
the magnitude of the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients [72, 73]; only changing
the sign of the DCT coefficients [31]; permuting the magnitude as well as inverting the
sign of the coefficients depending upon the frequency contents [48]. However, such DCT-
based-scrambling provides a weak protection as fixation of DC-coefficients and changing
AC-coefficients could help to recognise a protected face [82, 101, 102]. To provide a strong
scrambling effect in H.264/AVC standard, different approaches are suggested. For example:
encrypt the sign of non-zero coefficients as well as Intra Predicted Modes (IPM) [49]; modify
the IPM of smaller blocks (4 × 4) and Motion Vector Difference (MDV) of larger blocks
(greater than 4× 4) [50]; first encrypt the DC coefficients and then permute both DC and
AC coefficients [82]. However, it is shown that the transform domain scrambling degrades
coding efficiency. In order to avoid degradation of coding efficiency and full decode/encode
of the video for privacy protection, it is proposed to perform scrambling in the code-stream
for MPEG-4 [20]. However, code stream domain scrambling does not guarantee that it
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would be decodable by the standard player.
Other adaptive reversible filters like warping [30] and morphing [76] only work in the space
domain. Warping shuﬄes the co-ordinates of a face by exploiting key pixels, while morphing
blends an original source face with a target (reference) face by selecting key points in
both faces. Recently, in order to preserve facial expressions in morphing, image melding is
exploited [78, 103]. The limitation of warping is that it generates flicker while morphing
requires both faces at the same pose.
Non-adaptive reversible filters distort the sensitive-regions but cannot control the distortion
strength. These filters are usually based on generic encryption (i.e. Data Encryption Stan-
dard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)), and chaotic encryption. Examples
of privacy filters using these encryption algorithms are: Privacy through Invertible Cryp-
tographic Obscuration (PICO) [19, 83], Privacy using Chaos Cryptography (PCC) [84] and
Privacy by Trusted Computing (PTC) [85]. Depending upon the compression format, PICO
encrypts the sensitive-region in the spatial domain or frequency domain and also presents
a prototype “PrivacyCam” [83]. Similarly, PTC uses a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
microchip to provide hardware enabled privacy protection through AES algorithm [85]. In-
stead of traditional cryptography, PCC evaluates the chaotic cryptography to conceal a
sensitive-region [84]. It is shown that the chaos cryptography is computationally more effi-
cient compared to traditional cryptography as the size of the sensitive-region is increased.
However, the main disadvantage of traditional as well as chaotic encryption is that it leaves
sensitive-region incomprehensible.
Another non-adaptive reversible filter has recently been developed using false colours which
has been evaluated only against a na¨ıve attack [98]. In this filter, the RGB pixel intensities
belonging to the sensitive-region are first converted into grey scale which are then mapped
to another RGB pixel intensities using custom colour pallets. To make it reversible, the
vector difference of the original RGB and mapped-RGB pixel intensities are encoded in the
JPEG format.
Irreversible privacy filters: These privacy filters either permanently deform the fea-
tures of a sensitive-region or replace it with another de-identified sensitive-region. Irre-
versible privacy filters, like reversible filters, can also be further categorised into adaptive
and non-adaptive filters.
Adaptive irreversible privacy filters tend to remove the high frequency contents of a sensitive-
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Figure 2.4: An image protected with irreversible privacy filters: (a) Original (source [104])
(b) pixelation, (c) Gaussian blur and (d) cartooning.
region which are usually exploited for identification. These filters usually operate in the
spatial domain and distort the pixel intensities of a sensitive-region which are not fully
re-storable. Examples of adaptive irreversible privacy filters are pixelation [26], Gaussian
blur [28] and cartooning [21] (see Figure 2.4). Pixelation computes the average of the pixel
intensities in the predefined kernel and then replaces all the pixel intensities with their
average value. In contrast, Gaussian blur computes individual pixel-intensity using the
weighted neighbouring pixel intensities defined by the Gaussian function. Cartooning filter
first applies a mean shift algorithm to cluster colour information and then superimposes
separately detected edges.
Due to the simplicity of the adaptive irreversible filters, different privacy-preserving frame-
works using these filters have recently been proposed for MAVs. These frameworks apply
adaptive irreversible privacy filters at the ground station [79], server [39] or on-board [4].
Ground station based frameworks apply these filters after downloading the videos at the
end user’s device [79]. Such a framework is perceptible to attacks while the videos are being
downloaded and therefore could leak privacy. To resist attacks, a server-based privacy-
preserving framework is presented in which MAVs send encrypted videos to the server for
filtering the sensitive-regions before forwarding them to the end users [39]. The server-based
approach could cause latency due to traversing the videos between an MAV, server and end
user. To overcome this latency issue, UAS-VPG [4] aims for on-board implementation which
focusses on face detection from MAVs in order to apply Gaussian blur. However, it has
been shown that Gaussian blur and pixelation are weak privacy filters [12, 40, 105]. That
means, if an attacker successfully estimates the filter parameters, original sensitive-regions
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Figure 2.5: Faces de-identified using k-Same algorithm [12] using different values of k.
(a-e): First row represents the original images, while the second row shows de-identified
faces. As the k-Same algorithm does not consider pose, gender or facial-expression for the
de-identification, it results into poor quality of de-identified faces.
can be recognised with high accuracy. Although such an attack has not been studied for
the cartooning filter, some privacy leakage is expected as well.
Non-adaptive irreversible privacy filters either remove a sensitive-region [11, 88–90] or
replace it with an abstraction to maintain aesthetic pleasantness or behaviour informa-
tion [9, 15]. Different abstraction methods have been proposed to replace a human body,
e.g. bounding box, avatars, edge, transparency, silhouettes [15, 24–27]. To protect clothing
and skin colour, a neural-network is recently exploited to transfer the colour of a style image
to the detected human body [97, 106].
Specifically for human faces, face de-identification algorithm k-Same [12] replaces the cap-
tured k-faces with their average face to maintain k-anonymity (see Figure 2.5). However, it
does not maintain pose, facial expression and gender information. To maintain pose, facial
expression and gender information in the protected faces, k-Same-Select [44] and k-Same-M
[40] algorithms are proposed, which exploit pose, facial expression and gender detectors.
Recently, a number of variants of these algorithms have been developed in order to preserve
pose, facial expression, gender, race and age using their respective detectors [41, 91, 92].
To provide recognition accuracy less than 1/k where k is the number of faces in a cluster,
k-Same-furthest algorithm [45] is proposed which is basically an extension of k-Same. It
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iteratively forms two clusters of k-Same faces and then replaces each captured face in the
first cluster with the average of the second cluster and vice versa. Another extension of k-
Same is the k-Same-Net algorithm [46] that applies a Generative Neural Network (GNN) on
the k-Same algorithm to generate privacy-preserved faces while maintaining the attributes
of the unprotected face, e.g. facial expression, age and gender.
Face de-identification can also be achieved by changing the projection bases. For example,
arbitrarily modifying the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA) projections of a captured face can protect it from face recognition algorithms
under the na¨ıve attack [94]. Similarly, the captured face could be de-identified by projecting
it on a hypersphere of a radius that is estimated using the gallery faces [95, 96].
Although all the face de-identification algorithms based on k-anonymity are aesthetically
pleasant and also exhibit attacks resilience, their suitability highly depends upon sophis-
ticated visual detectors, i.e. pose, gender, race, age or facial-expression whose accuracy
depends upon face resolution, face pose and illumination conditions which are often critical
challenges in airborne photography and videography.
2.3.2 Context-Oriented Privacy Filters
Context-oriented post-processing privacy filters protect the identity leakage from the back-
ground (i.e. captured context) of a video after capturing the video. In particular, these
filters aim to distort or remove any location or time related clue from the background of
the images and videos that may help in inferring the identity of a bystander. Context-
oriented post-processing privacy filters are autonomous and can be divided into reversible
and irreversible categories.
Reversible Context-Oriented Privacy Filters
These filters protect the background of the images and videos with an aim to fully recover
back if required. A comprehensive design of a privacy protected framework with fully
recoverable background is presented by Senior et al. [15]. During the video analysis, different
information streams carrying background and foreground objects are generated which are
further encrypted for conditional access (see Figure 2.6). To recover back original video
including the background, all the information streams are decrypted and foreground objects
are placed back in the background image.
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Figure 2.6: Reversible foreground and context protection in videos. The left side shows a
video frame which could be rendered based on foreground and contextual objects shown on
the right side. All the original foreground and contextual objects are encrypted and could
recover the complete left image, if required. This figure is an adaptation from [15].
Irreversible Context-Oriented privacy filters
These filters protect the background by using existing irreversible algorithms e.g. blank
out, pixelate or Gaussian blur. In particular, these filters protect any clue of location or
time information captured in the background that could assist in identifying bystanders
[16]. Through subjective evaluation, it is shown that if viewers do not have acquittance of
the context and the captured context i.e. the background is protected, they are unable to
determine identities of bystanders. However, protecting only the textual clues of location
and time information in the background has a serious drawback as the advanced computer
vision algorithms can classify background into common areas, bedrooms, bathrooms, office
with high accuracy [99]. To the best of our knowledge, it is the only irreversible context-
oriented privacy filter.
However, a lot of work has been carried out to protect spatio-temporal information of
bystanders in Location Based Service (LBS) and participatory sensing field which use non-
visual data, e.g. WLAN, 3G/LTE, Bluetooth. This work can be broadly divided into loca-
tion and trajectory protection [107]. Location protection is usually achieved by inserting
dummy locations instead of originals [108], spatio-temporal cloaking to achieve k-anonymity
[109, 110] and intentionally degrading location/time information [111]. The trajectory pro-
tection approaches usually protect the complete route, i.e. origin, intermediate and desti-
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nation points by developing dummy trajectories [112], and grouping trajectories to achieve
k-anonymity [107, 113–115].
Visual context protection is a great challenge in both fixed and airborne cameras. Applying
LBS and participatory sensing approaches to the visual data and at the same time main-
taining high fidelity becomes very difficult and challenging task. Thus, it is one of the open
research areas to focus.
2.4 Resolution for Face Recognition
Face recognition is about determining the identity information of an individual [116, 117].
Face recognition can be performed either by humans or machine algorithms. Both have
their own constraints to accomplish it. Parameters such as camera resolution on the tar-
get, camera view angle, occlusion, lighting conditions accumulate uncertainty in fulfilling
this recognition task. Among these, we explore minimum resolution required for the face
recognition by both humans and machine algorithms.
For a human, considering full human body, British Security Industry Association (BSIA)
and European Committee for Standardization (CEN) have stated minimum pixel density
and body to viewing screen ratio for face recognition [118, 119]. In contrast, Axis Commu-
nication (AC) argues that for digital cameras just horizontal pixel density is sufficient and
explicitly states the required horizontal pixel density for the face recognition [120] which is
given in Table 2.2.
AC states the horizontal pixel density but not the required vertical pixel density. The reason
might be that mostly CCTV cameras are installed at low height with a slight tilt angle.
Therefore, the stated pixel density in the horizontal direction also ensures sufficient pixel
density in the vertical directions. This can be acceptable in the CCTV environment, but in
airborne videos it is not always true. For example, for a directly downward looking camera,
we might achieve the stated horizontal pixel density, but with a very low pixel density in
the vertical direction. Therefore, for airborne videos, minimum vertical pixel density is also
required in addition to the horizontal one.
For a standard stated horizontal pixel density, corresponding vertical pixel density can be
estimated through camera dimensions and assuming an angle of about 20◦ between ceiling
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Table 2.2: Face recognition requirements for a human face by a human operator and a
machine algorithm (PCA/LDA based face recognizer for accuracy greater than 70%). In
this table, a face width of 16 cm has been assumed to determine horizontal number of pixels.
Objective
Human Operator [120] Machine Algorithm [121]
Pixels per Pixel Density Pixels per Pixel Density
face (horizontal) (px/cm) face (px/cm)
Identification (good) 40 2.5 21× 21 1.31
Identification (challenging) 80 5 64× 64 4
of the building and camera’s principal axis, which is given as
ρv = ρh
HI
WI
cos(20◦), (2.4)
where ρh, ρv are pixel densities, and WI , HI are image dimensions in the horizontal and
vertical directions, respectively. For example, for an HD video (1920x1080), required value
of ρv to recognize a face is 1.3214 px/cm (good condition) or 2.6429 px/cm (challenging
condition).
Regarding face recognition by machine algorithms under different poses and illumination
conditions, T. Marciniak et al. [121] performed experiments to determine the required
minimum resolution. They used MUCT data set and a PCA/LDA based face recognizer.
It was found that under a pose variation of 21◦ and the down-sampling of the faces until
21×21 pixels, accuracy remains above 70%. This was just about 10% less than the accuracy
of the faces having 256 × 256 pixels. For the illumination variations, they found that the
required resolution is 64 × 64 pixels for the same accuracy, i.e. greater than 70%. These
results and the corresponding pixel densities are also stated in Table 2.2.
Recently, C. Lu and X. Tang [122] showed that their face recognizer called GaussianFace
achieved superior performance than humans on Labelled Faces in the Wild (LFW) data set
which contains high-resolution faces collected under uncontrolled environment. However,
the effect of low-resolution is not studied.
2.5 Limitations of the State-of-the-Art
This thesis is about protecting a bystander’s privacy after capturing the images and videos;
therefore, it leaves out pre-processing privacy filters from comparative analysis. Moreover,
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the thesis only focusses on the main-identifiers especially faces; therefore, it does not consider
works related to context protection. Thus, based on the three properties required for recre-
ational photography stated in Chapter 1 (i.e. attacks robustness, minimal spatio-temporal
distortion and computational complexity), the thesis presents a more detailed comparison
of post-processing privacy filters. A summary of this comparison is given in Table 2.3,
which includes a representative of reversible adaptive [20], reversible non-adaptive [19] and
irreversible non-adaptive privacy filters [41]. The rest [4, 13, 21, 47] and proposed are irre-
versible & adaptive filters. Compared to Table 2.1, Table 2.3 only includes post-processing,
sensitive-region oriented, autonomous privacy filters which can be adaptive, non-adaptive,
reversible and irreversible.
2.5.1 Spatio-temporal Distortion
The distortion control mechanism in the state-of-the-art adaptive privacy filters is fully or
partially manual [13, 21, 47], for example by manually selecting the kernel sizes for the given
images [13] or videos [20, 21]. Similarly, when the filter intensity from the centre to the
boundary of a detected face is automatically decreased, the kernel size at the centre is still
manually selected for the given video [47]. In addition, the 2D isotropic kernels in state-
of-the-art adaptive filters [13, 21, 47] can degrade a sensitive-region more severely when
the sensitive-region resolution is different in the horizontal and vertical direction as may be
typical in oblique images and videos. Thus, it is required to exploit the different horizontal
and vertical resolutions, and use anisotropic kernels and a fully automatic adaptivity based
on the resolution of the detected face. Moreover, state-of-the-art adaptive privacy filters
based on pseudo-random numbers, e.g. scrambling or warping often change their parameters
without considering associated temporal artefacts such as flicker generated by the abrupt
changes in the intensity values of protected frames.
2.5.2 Robustness
We compare robustness of reversible adaptive filters [20], reversible non-adaptive filters [19],
irreversible adaptive filters [41] and irreversible non-adaptive filters [4, 13, 21, 47] against
brute force, na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction attacks.
Both reversible adaptive filters and reversible non-adaptive filters are robust against a parrot
and a reconstruction attack, but they are prone to brute-force, spatial-domain [81, 81] and
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Table 2.3: Post-processing privacy filters. KEY – DCT-S: Discrete Cosine Transform Scram-
bling; PICO: Privacy through Invertible Cryptographic Obscuration; GARP: Gender, Age
and Race Preservation; SVGB: Space Variant Gaussian Blur; ODBVP: Optimal Distortion-
Based Visual Privacy; AGB: Adaptive Gaussian Blur; AHGMM: Adaptive Hopping Gaus-
sian Mixture Model. Adaptive control modulates the strength of a privacy filter.
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Distortion
adaptive control
image based 3 3 3 3
navigation sensors 3 3
spatial 2D kernel
isotropic 3 3 3
anisotropic 3 3
temporal correlation 3
Robustness
to brute force attack 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
to na¨ıve attack 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
to inverse filter attack 3 3 3
to super-resolution attack 3 3 3 3
to parrot attack
with detectors 3
without detectors 3 3 3
Computational simplicity 3 3 3 3
frequency-domain [101] attacks. In contrast, irreversible non-adaptive filters like GARP [41]
are robust against the parrot and reconstruction attacks. However, their suitability highly
depends upon sophisticated visual detectors such as pose, gender, race and age detectors.
The efficiency of these detectors depends on face resolution, face pose and illumination
conditions that are critical challenges in airborne photography. In contrast, irreversible
adaptive filters [4, 13, 21, 47] do not depend on any sophisticated visual detectors, but they
are prone to the parrot and reconstruction attacks.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter stated the definition of privacy in visual data and formally defined a privacy
filter. It reviewed and discussed the state-of-the-art privacy protection filters proposed
for airborne as well as CCTV cameras by categorising them into pre-processing and post-
processing privacy filters. It is found that pre-possessing are based either on access control
which is insufficient in case of oblique optics or detecting every sensitive-region before cap-
turing each frame which is a great challenge especially in an outdoor environment. Also,
these filters are non-adaptive (i.e. mostly provide blank out) and therefore cannot control
the distortion strength. In contrast, post-processing privacy filters are not based on access
control and can provide high fidelity. However, adaptive post-processing privacy filters are
prone to the parrot and reconstruction attacks, while non-adaptive post-processing privacy
filters use sophisticated detectors and therefore depends upon their detection accuracy. Fi-
nally, the thesis highlights the research gap of developing robust privacy filters that do not
require any sophisticated detector and also minimise spatio-temporal distortion.
Chapter 3
Privacy Design Space for Adaptive
Privacy Filtering
This chapter defines a mechanism for privacy design space exploration that allows to auto-
matically configure an adaptive privacy filter to protect a face. The mechanism uses the
resolution of the detected face to determine when it is inherently protected. The mecha-
nism exploits the auxiliary data from the on-board navigation sensors (GPS and IMU) to
determine when a face is not inherently protected and then apply an adaptive privacy filter
that distorts the face region depending upon its captured resolution. The block diagram of
the proposed approach is shown in Figure 3.1.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 discusses the concept of privacy design
space and presents its analytical results. Section 3.2 describes the design of an adaptive
privacy filter and shows example filtered faces. Section 3.3 presents experimental results.
Finally, Section 3.4 summarizes the findings and limitations of the work presented in this
chapter.
3.1 Privacy Design Space
Let an MAV fly at an altitude of h1 meters. Let the principal axis P of its on-board camera
be tilted by θP from the nadir direction N (see Figure 3.2). A value of θP 6= 0 generates
an oblique image. Each frame It at time t could contain U faces. However, for simplicity
but without loss of generality the thesis only consider the case of U = 1. Let Rt represent
the face region in the image, which is viewed at an angle θR. Finally, let h2 be the height
35
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Figure 3.1: Block diagram of the proposed adaptive privacy filtering framework for airborne
cameras.
of the face above ground.
Let the pixel density be defined as the number of pixels (px) per unit distance (cm) in a
certain portion of the image It. Let ρh and ρv represent the pixel density (px/cm) around
the centre CR of Rt in the horizontal and vertical direction, respectively (see Figure 3.3).
Our goal is to determine whether ρh and ρv are sufficiently large to facilitate the recognition
of the identity of the person whose face is captured in Rt and then to apply an adaptive
privacy filter in case recognition is considered possible.
Using reliable commercial-off-the-shelf differential GPS and IMU units, an MAV can esti-
mate its position with an error that is smaller than 10−20 cm [125]. The thesis assumes that
on-board navigation sensor’s data is available for each It with high accuracy and therefore
use these auxiliary data to estimate h1 and θP .
Given a face detection result Rt in It, θR is determined using CR. For θP 6= 0, a pixel of
the image sensor covers an area of the 3D world of different size depending on its distance
and orientation [126], [127]. Let ph and pv represent the physical dimensions of a pixel in
the horizontal and vertical direction, respectively. If f is the focal length of the camera, the
horizontal density ρh for a pixel around CR can be determined as
ρh =
fcos(θR)
ph(h1 − h2) , (3.1)
and the vertical density ρv as
ρv ≈ fcos(θR)sin(θR)
pv(h1 − h2) . (3.2)
Let the binary status variable ωR ∈ {0, 1} define whether Rt is naturally protected (ωR = 0)
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Figure 3.2: Capturing an image with an airborne camera at height h1. The principal axis
P of the camera is tilted by θP from the nadir direction N . The sensitive-region Rt, a face
at height h2 above the ground, is viewed at an angle θR. The variables ρh and ρv represent
the horizontal and vertical pixel density of Rt at its centre CR in the captured image.
because of a low horizontal and vertical density, or not (ωR = 1):
ωR =
1 if ρh > ρ
o
h & ρv > ρ
o
v
0 otherwise
(3.3)
where ρoh and ρ
o
v are experimentally defined thresholds. If ωR = 0, then the original frame
It can be transmitted without any modifications.
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show an example of ρh and ρv if we consider as camera a Canon EOS
5D Mark II in HD mode (1920×1080 pixels), whose sensor dimensions are 36 x 24 mm2,
thus ph = 18.75 µm and pv = 22.22 µm. We chose h2 = 1.7 m and h1 from 3 m to 150 m.
Typical lenses have a focal length from 10 mm to 200 mm. Finally, θR is assumed to vary
from 0◦ to 90◦. If we accept to compromise on fidelity, we can globally filter It using ρh
and ρv determined at θR = 45
◦. This would lead in certain image-capturing conditions to
an unnecessarily high level of blurring that reduces the fidelity of It.
Figure 4.3c depicts the boundary between the privacy sensitive space and the inherently
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Figure 3.3: Mapping of a face at height h2 to an image plane with oblique imagery. The
height h2 is considered between the ground and the centre of the face, CR, which is seen
from the back in the illustration.
protected space. The privacy sensitive space is determined by intersecting the individual
segmentations based on ρh and ρv using the thresholds ρ
o
h = 1 px/cm and ρ
o
v = 1 px/cm.
3.2 Adaptive Privacy Filtering
When Rt is unprotected (i.e. the face is recognisable), we want to apply an adaptive privacy
filter FΩj , where Ωj represents the parameter, so that the fidelity of the images can be
increased with respect to the use of a fixed privacy filter. The value of Ωj is such that the
corresponding filtering with Ωj turns ρh and ρv to be smaller than ρ
o
h and ρ
o
v, respectively.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.4: Horizontal and vertical pixel densities for EOS 5D Mark II in HD video mode
at different heights, with different focal lengths and tilt angles. (a) Variation of ρh for
different values of h1, f and θR. The largest values of ρh occur at θR = 0
◦. (b) Variation
of ρv for different values of h1, f and θR. The largest values of ρv occur at θR = 45
◦.
(c) Separation of the privacy sensitive space from the inherently protected space using
ρoh = ρ
o
v = 1 px/cm as segmentation threshold. The privacy sensitive space (indicated by
the green slices) corresponds to the intersection of the segmentation performed in (a) and
(b).
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For example, in pixelation Ωj is determined by the averaging kernel size [26], in blurring by
the standard deviation of a Gaussian [28], in cartooning by the kernel size of a mean shift
filter [21], in scrambling by the number of transform coefficients [31] and in warping by the
relocation distance of pixels with respect to the calculated values of ρh and ρv [30].
In this work, we use the Gaussian blur that is widely used for outdoor imagery [87]. There-
fore, FΩj becomes a convolution operation between Rt and a Gaussian Point Spread Func-
tion (PSF). Basically, a 2D PSF g(h, v), or impulse response, is the output of a filter
when the input is a point source. In the discrete domain [128], it is given as g(h, v) =
δ(h, v) ∗ g(h, v), where ∗ is the convolution operation and
δ(h, v) =
1 if h = v = 0,0 otherwise. (3.4)
In the case of Gaussian blur, g(h, v) is an approximated Gaussian function of mean µj and
standard deviation σj , and thus called a Gaussian PSF of parameter Ωj = (µj , σj). An
approximated anisotropic Gaussian PSF is defined as
g(h, v) =
1
2piσhσv
e
−
(
(h−µh)2
2σ2
h
+
(v−µv)2
2σ2v
)
, (3.5)
where µh, µv, σh and σv are the mean and standard deviations of the Gaussian in the
horizontal and vertical direction, respectively.
In a traditional Gaussian blur µj = 0 [13, 47], and σj ∈ {σjl|l ∈ N, σjl+1 > σjl} controls
the distortion strength of FΩj and provides pixel density ρj ∈ {ρjl|l ∈ N, ρjl+1 < ρjl} in R¯t,
respectively. As a higher σj results into lower ρj , we first find the minimum value called
optimal parameter σoj of σj that makes ρj < ρ
o
j . As a result, σ
o
j provides the minimum
distortion in R¯t while making it robust against the na¨ıve-T attack (i.e. P (R¯t|RG) → ).
Increasing σj beyond σ
o
j increases the distortion without improving the privacy level as the
recogniser performance is already at the level of the random classifier. For a face captured
from an MAV with pixel densities ρj , we calculate optimal parameters Ω
o
j = (µ
o
j , σ
o
j ) of a
Gaussian PSF, where µoj = 0 and σ
o
j is estimated as follows:
A Gaussian PSF of standard deviation σoj in the spatial domain is another Gaussian PSF
of standard deviation σ´oj in the frequency domain and both the Gaussian PSFs are related
as
σ´oj =
ρj
2piσoj
, (3.6)
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(a1: 8.34,7.23) (a2: 5.03,3.88) (a3: 3.96,2.87) (a4: 3.06,2.28) (a5: 2.32,2.03) (a6: 1.94,1.55) (a7: 1.55,1.28)
(b1: 97,85) (b2: 59,47) (b3: 47,35) (b4: 37,29) (b5: 29,25) (b6: 25,19) (b7: 19,17)
(c1: 121,105) (c2: 75,57) (c3: 59,43) (c4: 45,35) (c5: 35,31) (c6: 29,25) (c7: 25,21)
(d1: 161,141) (d2: 99,77) (d3: 77,57) (d4: 61,45) (d5: 47,41) (d6: 39,31) (d7: 31,27)
(e1) (e2) (e3) (e4) (e5) (e6) (e7)
Figure 3.5: Comparison between various degrees of Gaussian blur to protect a facial image
from an LDA face classifier. The numbers following a∗ represent the value of ρh and ρv,
respectively. The numbers following b∗, c∗, d∗ represent the value of ψh and ψv, respectively.
(a1-a7) Original images from [104] with decreasing pixel densities (from left to right). (b1-
b7) Gaussian blur on (a1-a7) with ρoh = ρ
o
v = 0.5 that results in slightly under-blurred
images (i.e. the recognition rate is higher than that of a random classifier). (c1-c7) Adaptive
Gaussian blur on (a1-a7) based on our proposed framework (ρoh = ρ
o
v = 0.4) resulting in an
adequate blurring of the faces for privacy preservation. With an adaptive Gaussian blur the
kernel is selected depending on the pixel density for Rt. (d1-d7) Gaussian blur on (a1-a7)
with ρoh = ρ
o
v = 0.3 that results in slightly over-blurred images that, although they make
the recognition rate equivalent to that of a random classifier, they unnecessarily decrease
the fidelity of the facial images. (e1-e7) Fixed Gaussian blur of (a1-a7) using a safe kernel
designed considering the highest possible pixel density in order to make the recognition
accuracy of a classifier equivalent to that of a random classifier, irrespective of the pixel
density for Rt, the face. This fixed Gaussian blur (ψh = 121, ψv = 105) significantly
deteriorates the fidelity of lower resolution faces.
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where σ´oj is measured in cycles/cm, σ
o
j in px and ρj in px/cm. Let fs represents the Nyquist
frequency of ρj . Let f
o
s < fs is the highest spatial frequency component that we want to
completely remove using a low pass filter, i.e. Gaussian blur. In other words, fos is the
Nyquist frequency of ρoj , i.e. pixel density after filtering. Both ρ
o
j and f
o
s are related as
ρoj = 2f
o
s . (3.7)
As we are interested in removing frequency components beyond fos , we can select f
o
s = 3σ´
o
j
because the amplitude response of a Gaussian PSF at three times of its standard deviation
is very close to zero and multiplication (convolution in space domain) with such a Gaussian
PSF will suppress frequencies larger than fos . Substituting f
o
s = 3σ´
o
j in Eq. 3.7, in the
resulting relation Eq. 3.6 and finally rearranging gives the optimal standard deviation of
Gaussian PSF as
σoj =
3ρj
piρoj
. (3.8)
Finally, the convolutional kernel ψj is determined by sampling the Gaussian function upto
three times of σoj as
ψj = 2d3σoj e+ 1. (3.9)
After convolving with a kernel of size ψj , the useful information is reduced to ρ
o
j (px/cm).
As a result a frame with protected face region I¯t is generated. Figure 3.5 shows sample
results of adaptive Gaussian blurring, estimated standard deviations σh and σv, and kernel
sizes ψh and ψv. From the figure, it is apparent how ψh and ψv decrease with decreasing ρh
and ρv, respectively. This adaptive behaviour of ψh and ψv aims at maintaining the fidelity
of the images. The required values of ρoh and ρ
o
v depend on the expected ability of a face
recogniser to discriminate identities.
In the next section we quantify the benefits of the proposed blurring approach.
3.3 Experimental Results
3.3.1 Setup
In this section we first study different target resolutions to determine the threshold values
for separating inherently protected and unprotected spaces. We then analyse the trade-off
between privacy and fidelity for adaptive and fixed privacy filters using standard face recog-
nition algorithms by measuring their recognition performance with images from airborne
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cameras. We use the LDA [117] and LBPH [116] algorithms for face recognition. The LDA
face recogniser reduces the class dimension by maximising the inter-class to intra-class scat-
ter ratio. In contrast, the LBPH face recogniser encodes a local structure instead of a full
image to reduce the class dimension.
To measure fidelity, we apply the Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) and the PSNR. The
SSIM measures the image quality by comparing the degradation in the structure of a pro-
tected image with the original [129], while the PSNR represents the power ratio of the
original image with respect to the error introduced by protection.
We use an outdoor data set emulating an MAV data set with the availability of auxiliary
data, created with a camera placed at different heights and distances from faces [104]. In
this data set, the principal axis of the camera is parallel to the ground, i.e. θP = 90
◦. In
order to compute the pixel densities for this particular setup, we modify Equations 3.1 and
3.2 as ρh =
fcos(90◦−θR)
phd
and ρv ≈ fcos
2(90◦−θR)
pvd
, where d represents the horizontal distance
between the face and the camera.
We consider an image as privacy protected when the face recognition algorithms achieve an
accuracy similar to that of a random classifier and therefore look for threshold values ρoh and
ρov resulting in a random classifier accuracy. The accuracy of a face recogniser corresponds
to the rank-1 value of the cumulative match curve.
The data set contains 11 subjects and thus the accuracy of a random classifier for this data
set is 0.091 (1/11). We chose data from 63 different positions for each individual resulting
in a total of 693 test images (63 × 11).
To train the LDA and LBPH face recognisers, we used separate training images, which
consisted of 11 images for each subject. For the detection of the face region, we annotated
the images with the ground truth of the eye locations. As described in [130], we pre-
processed all training and test images by (i) applying an affine transformation to compensate
for scale and face rotation, (ii) using a bilateral filter to reduce noise and to compensate for
light variations and finally (iii) masking to remove non-facial portions.
For the test images, we determined the values of ρh and ρv both by using auxiliary data
(see Equations 3.1 and 3.2) and by manually counting the number of pixels on a face and
normalising it by the standard face dimensions, i.e. the bitragion breadth of 15.9 cm and
menton-crinion length of 21.9 cm [131]. As shown in Figure 3.6a, there is a small difference
between the calculated pixel densities using these two methods with a Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE) of 0.39 px/cm for ρh and 0.74 px/cm for ρv, respectively. The main reason for
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Figure 3.6: (a) The pixel density variation (ρh and ρv) of the 693 images in the data
set based on auxiliary data and manually counting the pixels. (b) The achieved Rank-1
identification accuracy ηi of the LDA and LBPH face recognisers over the 693 raw images.
this error lies in our assumption of the identical height (h2) and the identical face dimension
for all 11 subjects.
3.3.2 Privacy Design Space
Figure 3.6b shows the recognition accuracy of LDA and LBPH over the original 693 test
images as well as the response of a random classifier for reference. The LBPH face recog-
niser clearly outperforms the LDA face recogniser. However, the clear identification of the
threshold values for the separation between the inherently protected and unprotected space
is not possible with this data. For LBPH, the separating boundary lies below ρh = 1.43
px/cm (and corresponding ρv = 1.15 px/cm). Although LDA touches the random classi-
fier level at ρh = 1.43 px/cm, this resolution cannot be considered as threshold with high
confidence, because the accuracy of LDA also dropped at ρh = 4.1 px/cm and then again
increased at ρh = 2.99 px/cm. Such behaviour may be due to the limited population size
of the data set. Thus, the separating boundary lies at or below ρh = 1.43 px/cm (and
corresponding ρv = 1.15 px/cm) for LDA.
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Figure 3.7: Rank-1 face identification accuracy ηi of adaptively filtered data with different
threshold values ρoh and ρ
o
v. (Left) LDA: The accuracy is similar to a random classifier at
ρoh = 0.4 px/cm, ρ
o
v = 0.4 px/cm. (Right) LBPH: The average response is close to a random
classifier at ρoh = 0.2 px/cm, ρ
o
v = 0.2 px/cm.
3.3.3 Adaptive Privacy Filtering
To explore the boundary further, we filter all test images with adaptive Gaussian blur to
degrade the pixel resolution to the specified levels of 0.6, 0.4 and 0.2 px/cm for both ρoh
and ρov. The kernel size of the Gaussian blur filter (ψh × ψv) is computed as described
in Section 3.2. We then determine the recognition accuracy over the degraded images.
Figure 3.7 shows that the accuracy of LDA remains mostly around the random classifier
accuracy of 0.091 at ρoh = 0.4 px/cm and ρ
o
v = 0.4 px/cm. Thus, we define ρ
o
h = 0.4 px/cm
and ρov = 0.4 as the boundary between the inherently protected and unprotected spaces for
LDA. Although the accuracy of LBPH fluctuates, its average response is close to a random
classifier at ρoh = 0.2 px/cm and ρ
o
v = 0.2 px/cm. We therefore use ρ
o
h = 0.2 px/cm and
ρov = 0.2 px/cm as the separating boundary for the LBPH.
Finally, we compare the fidelity of the adaptively filtered images with images filtered with a
fixed safe kernel. Therefore, we apply adaptive Gaussian blurring with ρoh = 0.4 px/cm and
ρov = 0.4 px/cm and fixed Gaussian blurring with kernel size ψh = 121 × ψv = 105 to all
images and measure the SSIM and PSNR values. Figure 3.8 shows that adaptive filtering
provides a higher fidelity in terms of SSIM and PSNR as compared to fixed safe filtering.
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Figure 3.8: Fidelity achieved with adaptive and fixed privacy filtering over 693 images using
the (top) Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) and the (bottom) Peak Signal to Noise Ratio
(PSNR).
3.4 Summary
This chapter focused on face recognition by machine algorithms from airborne cameras and
explored the design space to determine when a face in an airborne image is not recognisable.
Moreover, when faces are recognisable, the chapter proposed an adaptive filtering that
configured the strength of a privacy protection filter to improve the trade-off between privacy
protection and usability of an aerial video.
There are few limitations of the presented work. First, the population size of the data set was
small. Second, used face recognisers are not state-of-the-art. Third, adaptive Gaussian blur
faces are prone to the parrot and reconstruction attacks. These limitations are addressed
in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4
Robust Temporally-Smooth
Seamless Privacy-Protection
This chapter presents a privacy filter AHGMM for drone photography/videography that
improves the trade-off between privacy, fidelity and flicker. The proposed AHGMM distorts
a face region with secret parameters to be robust to na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction attacks.
Moreover, the filter minimises spatio-temporal distortion by adapting its parameters to the
resolution of the captured face. In particular, an optimal Gaussian PSF that reduces the
face resolution below a certain threshold is first selected. This protects the face against
the na¨ıve attack as well as maintains its resolution at a specified level. To prevent other
attacks, supplementary Gaussian kernels in the selected Gaussian kernel are then inserted
and their parameters are locally hopped using a PRNG so their estimation is difficult from
the filtered face image. Finally, such protected faces are temporally averaged with decaying
weights to minimise flicker.
The block diagram of the proposed AHGMM is shown in Figure 4.1. Face detection, pose
estimation, pixel density estimation, privacy protection test and optimal Gaussian PSF
blocks are explained in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, while the rest of the blocks are explained
in this chapter. For a single supplementary Gaussian PSF inside an optimal Gaussian PSF,
the AHGMM is illustrated in Figure 4.2, while the pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.1 states the objective of our proposed
AHGMM filter. Section 4.2 describes the generation of the hopping kernels for privacy
filtering. Section 4.3 gives the details of the local as well as global filtering and presents
47
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Figure 4.1: Block diagram of the proposed Adaptive Hopping Gaussian Mixture Model
filter. KEY – ρh, ρv: number of pixels (px) per unit distance (cm) (pixel densities) of a
sensitive-region Rt; h1, θP : altitude and tilt angle of the camera used to calculate the pixel
densities; ωR: control signal generated from the pixel densities to decide when to protect
Rt; R: sub-regions of Rt; σoh, σov: standard deviations for the hopping Gaussian mixture
model M that filters R to generate a protected sensitive-region R¯t; I¯t: protected image
created by spatio-temporal smoothing of R¯t.
sample filtered faces at different stages of the algorithm. Section 4.4 describes the details of
a concatenated spatio-temporal smoothing filter that provides seamless protection and min-
imises flicker. Section 4.5 discusses the computational complexity of the algorithm. Finally,
Section 4.6 presents the summary of the chapter.
4.1 Objectives
Our objective is to robustly protect a face against different attacks with a minimal spatio-
temporal distortion, i.e. it aims at high fidelity and low flicker. Thus, our objective can be
split into two competing targets: robust privacy protection and minimal spatio-temporal
distortion.
4.1.1 Robust Privacy Protection
First of all, FΩj should protect R¯t such that it is not recognisable from humans and face
recognition algorithms under the na¨ıve-T attack (i.e. P (R¯t|RG) → ). In addition, the
irreversible adaptive filter should ensure that the probability of correctly predicting the
label of R¯t is not increased in case of a parrot-T attack (i.e. P (R¯t|R¯G) → ) as well as a
reconstruction attack (i.e. P (Rˆt|RG)→  or P (Rˆt|RˆG)→ ). Thus, the first objective of an
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Figure 4.2: Visualisation of local filtering in AHGMM. The face region Rt is divided into Z
sub-regions and each sub-region Rtz is convolved (∗) with a hopping Gaussian mixture model
kernel Mz, which is made by an optimal Gaussian function and one (or more) supplementary
Gaussian function added inside the optimal Gaussian function. While convolving with each
sub-region of the face, the optimal and the supplementary Gaussian functions change their
parameters, i.e. mean and standard deviation, which consequently changes the shape of the
Gaussian mixture model based kernel.
irreversible privacy filter is as:
P (R¯t|B)→ . (4.1)
In other words, the face image should be protected in such way that the probability P (R¯t|B)
of the protected face should not be better than a random classifier, irrespective whether the
filtered or reconstructed face is compared against the unprotected, filtered or reconstructed
gallery data sets. As the stated objective is dependent upon the recognition capability of
a face recogniser, such objectives are heuristically solved for a given state-of-the-art face
recogniser [42, 65, 96].
4.1.2 Minimal Spatio-Temporal Distortion
The second concurrent and competing target is that R¯t should be protected with a minimal
spatio-temporal distortion D. As a higher Ωj results in lower ρj or higher D, an irreversible
adaptive filter should optimally select parameter Ωj to minimise spatial distortion. In
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addition, if the resolution of Rt changes within a video, FΩj should automatically adapt Ωj
to ensure a minimal spatial distortion. Finally, the selection of Ωj in each frame should be
in such a way that it also minimises any temporal distortion. Thus, the second objective of
an irreversible privacy filter, without affecting the validity of Eq. 4.1, is as:
R¯t = FΩ∗j (Rt), (4.2)
where Ω∗j is an ideal distortion parameter in each frame to minimise spatio-temporal dis-
tortion. If Et(w, h) = FΩj (Rt(w, h))−Rt(w, h), the ideal distortion parameter, Ω∗j , should
be derived as:
Ω∗j = arg min
Ωj
(
1
WH
W∑
w=1
H∑
h=1
(
Et(w, h) + ξ(w, h)
)
+
(
P (R¯t|B)− 
))
. (4.3)
4.2 Hopping GMM Kernels
Filtering a detected face region Rt with the optimal Gaussian PSF (see Section 3.2) defined
by Ωoj would only protect Rt from a na¨ıve-T attack but not from a parrot-T attack and a
recontrution attack. To ensure that the probability of correctly predicting the label of R¯t is
not increased in case of the parrot-T attack (i.e. P (R¯t|R¯G)→ ) as well as the reconstruction
attack (i.e. P (Rˆt|RG)→  or P (Rˆt|RˆG)→ ), Ωoj is secretly modified to Ω∗j while generating
R¯t so that an adversary is unable to accurately reconstruct face region Rˆt, or even generate
RˆG and R¯G . For this purpose, a set R is generated which consists of Z sub-regions in such
a way that each sub-region covers a small area of Rt:
R =
{
Rtz|z ∈ [1, Z]
}
. (4.4)
The size of Rtz (in pixels) affects the total number of sub-regions Z per face region Rt,
which influences its privacy level. Smaller values of Z (bigger sub-regions) result in a
reduced distortion.
After finding Ωoj = (µ
o
j , σ
o
j ) and generating R, we make a hopping mixture of Gaussians for
each sub-region, i.e. we pseudo-randomly change Ωoj to Ω
∗
j for each Rtz. Moreover, we select
supplementary Gaussian PSFs inside this optimal Gaussian PSF and vary their parameters,
which are restricted by σoj (lines 9-17 in Algorithm 1).
A set X containing the parameters of the Gaussian PSFs is built based on Z and the
supplementary Gaussian PSFs for each sub-region, and is represented as
X =
{
(µjm, σjm)z|z ∈ [1, Z], j ∈ {h, v},m ∈ [0,M ]
}
, (4.5)
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Algorithm 1 AHGMM
Input: It unprotected image
Rt detected face region
ρj pixel density, where j ∈ {h, v}
Output: I¯t protected image
1: procedure FilterAHGMM(I,R, ρh, ρv)
2: for j = h : v do
3: µoj ← 0
4: σoj ← 3ρjpiρoj
5: end for
6: R ← Z sub-regions of Rt
7: for z = 1 : Z do
8: for m = 0 : M do
9: for j = h : v do
10: if m = 0 then
11: µjm ← ±αjmσoj
12: σjm ← (1± βjm)σoj
13: else
14: µjm ← ±αjmσojγjm
15: σjm ← (1± βjm)σojγjm
16: end if
17: end for
18: Xz ← (µjm, σjm)z
19: Gmz ← compute Gaussian functions
20: φmz ← generate weights
21: end for
22: Mz ← Gaussian mixture model
23: R¯tz ← Rtz ∗Mz
24: end for
25: R¯t ← apply global filter on R¯
26: R¯st ← apply spatio-temporal smoothing filter on R¯t
27: I¯t ← replace Rt with R¯st in It
28: return I¯t
29: end procedure
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Figure 4.3: Minimising blocking artefacts of spatially hopping Gaussian functions in
AHGMM filter by a convolution with a global kernel. (a) Original image of 96 × 96 pix-
els from the LFW data set, (b) image after local filtering in AHGMM showing blocking
artefacts and (c) image after the local filtering followed by the global filtering in AHGMM.
where M is the number of the supplementary Gaussian PSFs. The element m = 0 represents
the modified optimal Gaussian PSF given by
µj0 = ±αj0σoj , (4.6)
σj0 = (1± βj0)σoj , (4.7)
while the remaining elements (i.e. m ∈ (0,M ]) belong to the supplementary Gaussian PSFs.
These elements are calculated as
µjm = ±αjmσojγjm, (4.8)
σjm = (1± βjm)σojγjm, (4.9)
where, αjm ∈ [0, 1] and βjm ∈ [0, 1] are normalised pseudo-randomly generated numbers
and control the local distortion in filtering. The variable γjm ∈ (0, 1] controls the relative
size of the supplementary Gaussian PSF w.r.t. the optimal Gaussian PSF.
After generating the parameters of the Gaussian PSFs, a set G representing 2D anisotropic-
discretised Gaussian PSFs corresponding to X is created as
G =
{
Gmz|z ∈ [1, Z],m ∈ [0,M ]
}
, (4.10)
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where each Gmz is calculated (line 19 in Algorithm 1) as [132]
Gmz ≈ Amze
−
(
(h−µhmz)2
2σ2
hmz
+
(v−µvmz)2
2σ2vmz
)
, (4.11)
where
Amz = 1
/ ∑
(h,v)∈d
e
−
(
(h−µhmz)2
2(σhmz)
2 +
(v−µvmz)2
2(σvmz)2
)
, (4.12)
and
d =
{
(h, v) ∈ Z2 :
⌈
−ψh
2
⌉
≤ h ≤
⌈
ψh
2
⌉
,
⌈
−ψv
2
⌉
≤ v ≤
⌈
ψv
2
⌉}
, (4.13)
with ψj = 2
⌈
3σj
⌉
+1. In order to develop a mixture model from the M discretised Gaussian
PSFs of each sub-region, a set of weights φ is required. We again utilise PRNG to generate
φ such that
φ =
{
φmz|z ∈ [1, Z],m ∈ [0,M ],
M∑
m=0
φmz = 1
}
. (4.14)
Finally, a set of mixture models is generated for each sub-region (line 22 in Algorithm 1)
as
M =
{
Mz|z ∈ [1, Z]
}
, (4.15)
where each element is calculated as
Mz =
M∑
m=0
φmzGmz. (4.16)
4.3 Local and Global Filter
We have now Z discretised Gaussian mixture models in M for Z sub-regions of Rt. We
locally convolve each sub-region Rtz (Eq. 4.4) with their respective Mz to make a protected
sub-region R¯tz:
R¯ =
{
R¯tz|z ∈ [1, Z]
}
, (4.17)
where R¯tz = Rtz ∗Mz. Changing the convolutional kernel for each sub-region generates
blocking artefacts (see Figure 4.3). To smooth these artefacts, we apply a global convolution
filter (line 25 in Algorithm 1) with a Gaussian kernel of zero mean and standard deviation
σ¯j =
σoj
Qj
, (4.18)
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Figure 4.4: Visual comparison between fixed Gaussian blur (FGB), AGB [29] and AHGMM
on the multi-resolution synthetically generated face data set. (a) Original images with pixel
densities decreasing from left to right due different height and pitch angle. (.,.) indicates
the horizontal and vertical pixel density in px/cm, respectively. (b-d) For various thresholds
(ρoh, ρ
o
v), results of FGB (first row), AGB (second row) and AHGMM filter (third row). For
each threshold, FGB is selected w.r.t. the highest pixel density image in the data set. FGB
does not adapt its parameters and therefore results into almost blanking out the image with
smaller pixel density. In contrast, both AGB and AHGMM maintain high smoothness by
varying their parameters depending upon the pixel densities of an image. Comparatively,
AGB produces smoother images, while AHGMM filter creates blocking artefacts due to
spatial switching of its parameters.
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where Qj represents the sub-region size in pixels. As a result, a spatially smoothed protected
face R¯t is developed. Figure 4.5 shows few sample images filtered by AHGMM at different
thresholds.
4.4 Spatio-temporal Smoothing Filter
Directly replacing the original with the protected face region R¯t may introduce strong
boundary effects in a protectd frame I¯t. Moreover, in case of videography, the hopping
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) for different sub-regions of a frame introduces flicker as
the Gaussian mixture models are not temporally correlated and change from frame to frame
independently.
In order to mitigate these problems and generate a temporally smooth and seamlessly
protected face R¯st , we blend the boundary of R¯t and low-pass filter it as:
R¯st = αt[αsR¯t + (1 − αs)Rt] + (1 − αt)[αsR¯t−1 + (1 − αs)Rt−1], (4.19)
where αs ∈ [0, 1] and αt ∈ [0, 1] are a spatial and a temporal weight, respectively. As a
constant value of αs blends R¯t and Rt, but does not remove the sharp boundary between
R¯t and I¯t, we decrease αs moving away from the boundary of the region. Moreover, a lower
value of αt increases smoothness but may introduce unpleasant delays in the video when
the person moves. For this reason, to balance smoothness and delay, we adaptively select
αt depending on the motion of the face region, which is measured as displacement of the
centres of R¯t and R¯t−1.
4.5 Computational Complexity
The generation of a convolutional kernel is more complex in AHGMM than in the adaptive
Gaussian blur filter (see Section 3.2). In fact, the latter only needs to compute a single
Gaussian function, while AHGMM requires the computation of MZ Gaussian functions.
Moreover, the adaptive Gaussian blur exploits the separability property of 2D convolutional
kernels, i.e. ψ = ψh ∗ψv, to reduce the number of multiplications and additions from W ·H ·
|ψh| · |ψv| to W ·H · (|ψh| + |ψv|) (W and H represent the width and height of Rt in pixels,
respectively). Instead, AHGMM dynamically reconfigures the convolutional kernel after
processing each sub-region and therefore requires exactly W ·H ·|ψh|·|ψv|multiplications and
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.5: A face image protected with different privacy filters. (a) Original image (crop).
Image protected with (b) pixelation, (c) AHGMM without temporal smoothing, and (d)
AHGMM with temporal smoothing.
additions. Moreover, temporal smoothing filter requires additional 2 ·W ·H multiplications
in case of videography.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presented an irreversible visual privacy protection filter that is based on spatio-
temporal processing of faces. The proposed filter is based on an adaptive hopping Gaussian
mixture model. Depending upon the captured resolution of a sensitive-region, the filter
globally adapts the parameters of the Gaussian mixture model to minimise the spatial
distortion, while locally hop them pseudo-randomly so that an attacker is unable to estimate
these parameters. Finally, the boundaries of the protected sensitive-regions are spatially
blended for a seamless insertion in a frame. Specifically for the videography, the filter
concatenates spatially hopping GMM kernels with a temporally low pass filter to generate
smoothly protected faces.
Unlike face-de-identification approaches ([12, 40, 41, 44, 91, 92, 95]), the proposed filter
does not depend on a sophisticated detector (i.e. pose, facial expression, age, gender, race).
Chapter 5
Experimental Results
This chapter presents the experimental results to determine the validity of the proposed
AHGMM algorithm to protect privacy as well as to minimise spatio-temporal distortion.
The chapter separately discusses the experiments for photography and videography sce-
narios. For the photography experiments, the chapter uses a synthetically generated face
image data set, while for the videography experiments, it exploits a small real airborne data
set. For both photography and videography experiments, it assumes different levels of prior
knowledge of an attacker and evaluates the privacy loss under a na¨ıve attack, a parrot attack
and a reconstruction attack. Moreover, it quantifies the corresponding fidelity degradation
caused by the AHGMM and presents the trade-off analysis between privacy loss and fidelity.
In the case of videography, the chapter also measures flicker subjectively and objectively,
and presents the trade-off analysis between privacy loss, fidelity and flicker.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 presents the experimental results for air-
borne photography. Section 5.2 discusses the experimental results for airborne videography.
Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 5.3.
5.1 Experimental Results for Photography
5.1.1 Setup
To the best of our knowledge, there is no large publicly available face data set collected
from an MAV. We therefore generate face images as if they were captured from an MAV via
geometric transformation and down-sampling on the LFW data set [133] (see Appendix A).
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The LFW data set was collected in an unconstrained environment with extreme illumination
conditions and extreme poses. We use the standard verification benchmark test of the LFW
data set (12000 images of 4281 subjects), divided into 10-folds for cross-validation. Each
fold contains 600 images of the same subject and 600 images of different subjects. We use
the deep funnelled version of the LFW data set. Using these 12000 images, we synthetically
generated 480,000 images emulating 40 different positions in space (i.e. 5 resolutions and 8
pitch angles).
We compare AHGMM against SVGB [47], Adaptive Gaussian Blur (AGB) (see Section 3.2)
and Fixed Gaussian Blur (FGB), which uses a constant Gaussian kernel defined with respect
to the highest resolution face. Thus, we estimate the kernel for FGB as in AGB for the
face with 96× 96 pixels at 0◦ pitch angle. For the SVGB filter, we divide the face into four
concentric circles and reduce the kernel size by 5% while radially moving out between two
consecutive regions as in [47]. Although the kernel for the innermost region was manually
selected in the original work, we choose the anisotropic kernel as estimated by the AGB
and convert it into an isotropic kernel for a fair comparison. We use a block size of 4 × 4
and m = 1 for the AHGMM.
To compare privacy filters, we measure the face verfication accuracy ηv (see Eq. 1.5) using
OpenFace [134], an open source implementation of Google’s face recognition algorithm
FaceNet [135]. OpenFace uses a deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) as a feature
extractor, which is trained by a large face data set (500k images). This feature extractor
is applied on the training and test images for their representations (embeddings) which are
used for verification/classification [135].
To measure distortion as in [21, 56], we apply the PSNR (see Eq. 1.1), the power ratio of
the original image with respect to the filtered image.
We perform experiments with 480,000 images (consisting of 5 different resolutions and 8
different pitch angles) to determine the validity of the proposed AHGMM to protect the
identity information of an individual. For this purpose, we analyse the effect of a na¨ıve-T
attack, a parrot-T attack, an inverse filter attack and a super-resolution attack. Moreover,
we quantify the corresponding fidelity degradation caused by the AHGMM.
As AGB and SVGB do not use any secret key, we evaluate them only using their accurate
parameters in the parrot-T, inverse filter and super-resolution attacks. In contrast, any of
these attacks on AHGMM can be further divided into three sub-attacks: optimal kernel,
pseudo AHGMM and accurate AHGMM. In the optimal kernel sub-attack, we assume that
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Table 5.1: Attacks used to evaluate the privacy loss of the proposed AHGMM algorithm.
Both the gallery faces and the probe faces can be protected or unprotected (na¨ıve-BL).
Moreover, the protected faces could be either unchanged or reconstructed (e.g. through an
inverse-filter (IF) or super-resolution (SR)). Finally, any AHGMM attack could be further
divided into three sub-attacks corresponding to the prior-knowledge of an attacker: optimal,
pseudo and accurate.
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an attacker is able to estimate the parameters of the optimal kernel and applies the optimal
kernel to the entire face. In the pseudo AHGMM sub-attack, we assume that the attacker
knows the optimal kernel and randomly modifies the filter parameter for the N sub-regions.
In the accurate AHGMM sub-attack, we assume that the attacker has access to the secret
key and can decipher all filter parameters for the N sub-regions. As this prior-knowledge
can be exploited for both probe and gallery images, we therefore evaluate AHGMM under
13 different scenarios stated in Table 5.1.
We assume that an attacker is able to determine the pitch angle of a protected face using
the background information of an image captured from an MAV and can apply a geometric
transformation to transform the gallery images at that pitch angle. Therefore, in all the
following attacks, both the gallery and the probe images are at the same pitch angle which
can be protected or unprotected depending upon the attack type. Moreover, we use the
same resolution for both the gallery images and the probe images.
5.1.2 Na¨ıve-T Attack
First of all, we perform a na¨ıve-BL attack which shows the baseline face verfication accuracy
when both the probe data set and the gallery data set are unprotected. The results of the
na¨ıve-BL attack are given in Figure 5.1. After that we perform a na¨ıve-T attack in which
the gallery images are unprotected, while the probe images are protected using FGB, SVGB,
AGB and AHGMM. The results of this attack are given in Figure 5.2 at different thresholds
ρoj .
The na¨ıve-BL attack shows that the accuracy ηv of our synthetically generated data set
decreases with the decrease of the face resolution and with the increase in the face pitch
angle. However, this trend vanishes at high pitch angles, i.e. 60◦ and 70◦, where it shows
slight randomness. Finally, for the low resolution faces (6 × 6 pixels), the accuracy does
not show any effect of the pitch angle and slightly oscillates. Therefore, we consider 6 × 6
pixels inherently privacy protected and remove these images from the analysis of the privacy
filters.
From the na¨ıve-T attack, we are interested in finding the optimal threshold which defines
the optimal kernel for AGB (see Eq. 3.8). It is clear from Figure 5.2 that the accuracy of
the na¨ıve-T attack decreases while decreasing the threshold. When the threshold reaches
0.5 px/cm, the difference between the accuracy achieved by AGB and a random classifier
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Figure 5.1: Face verification accuracy ηv of a na¨ıve-BL attack on our synthetically generated
face data set. In general, ηv increases with increasing the face size except at high pitch angles
of 60 and 70 degrees where it slightly fluctuates randomly. For 6× 6 pixels faces, ηv is the
lowest and rather independent of the pitch angle.
(ηv = 0.5) becomes very small except, unexpectedly, at high pitch angles. This difference
further decreases at 0.4 px/cm and 0.3 px/cm. Thus, the optimal threshold defining the
optimal kernel can be 0.5 px/cm, 0.4 px/cm and 0.3 px/cm. The later two thresholds
decreases the accuracy negligibly but distort the images severely. Therefore, we decide to
perform a trade-off analysis of the accuracy (under na¨ıve, parrot attack and reconstruction
attacks) and the distortion at these three thresholds.
At these three thresholds under the na¨ıve-T attack, the accuracy of the AHGMM is higher
as compared to the AGB. The main reason for this slightly higher accuracy is due to the
under blurred sub-regions of the AHGMM filtered face as it hops its kernel below and
above the optimal Gaussian kernel. In contrast, the accuracy of the SVGB is always lower
than AGB and AHGMM. This is because SVGB uses an isotropic Gaussian kernel which
deteriorates a face more severely as compared to the anisotropic kernel of the AGB and
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Figure 5.2: Face verification accuracy ηv achieved by na¨ıve and parrot attacks on images
protected by four different privacy protection filters at different thresholds ρoj : first row:
ρoj = 0.7 px/cm, second row: ρ
o
j = 0.6 px/cm, third row: ρ
o
j = 0.5 px/cm, fourth row:
ρoj = 0.4 px/cm, fifth row: ρ
o
j = 0.3 px/cm. The filled marker shows the mean and the
vertical bar indicates the standard deviation of ηv for the multi-resolution images (96× 96,
48 × 48, 24 × 24, 12 × 12). Legend: — AHGMM, — AGB, — SVGB, —
FGB. Under the na¨ıve-T attack, AHGMM posses the highest ηv which converges towards
ηv = 0.5 as the ρ
o
j is decreased and finally at ρ
o
j ≤ 0.5 px/cm, the difference between ηv of
AHGMM, AGB, SVGB and FGB becomes negligible, except unexpectedly at pitch angles
60◦ and 70◦ degrees. The parrot-T attack on AHGMM is divided into three sub-attacks:
optimal kernel parrot-T attack, pseudo AHGMM parrot-T attack and accurate AHGMM
parrot-T attack. In contrast to na¨ıve-T attack, AHGMM provides the lowest ηv under any
type of the three parrot-T attacks and this fact becomes negligible at ρoj = 0.3 px/cm under
accurate AHGMM parrot-T attack.
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AHGMM filter. FGB possess the lowest accuracy at any threshold due to over blurring of
all images except 96× 96 pixels images at 0◦ pitch angle.
5.1.3 Parrot-T Attack
In the parrot-T attack, we filter both gallery and probe images and then evaluate the
achieved accuracy. We study the parrot-T attack on AHGMM under three sub-attacks:
optimal kernel parrot-T sub-attack, pseudo AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack and accurate
AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack. The accuracy results of these sub-attacks are given in Figure
5.2 at different thresholds ρoj , while Receiver Operating Curves (ROCs) for the accurate
AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack at ρoj = 0.5 px/cm are presented in Figure 5.3.
The parrot-T attack on state-of-the-art privacy filters increases the accuracy as compared
to the na¨ıve-T attack. Under the optimal kernel parrot sub-attack, our AHGMM shows
the least accuracy improvement at any of the three thresholds. This is because the optimal
kernel Gaussian blur is a spatially invariant blur that is not helpful in recognising spatially
varying Gaussian blurred images, e.g. the AHGMM filtered images. Thus, our AHGMM
provides the lowest accuracy against the parrot-T attack using the optimal kernel.
The pseudo AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack slightly improves the accuracy further as com-
pared to the optimal kernel parrot-T sub-attack. The main reason is that both the gallery
and the probe images are now filtered using spatially varying Gaussian blur. However, under
the pseudo AHGMM sub-attack, the accuracy of AHGMM remains below the other three
state-of-the-art privacy filters. Thus, our AHGMM provides the highest privacy protection
even against the pseudo AHGMM parrot sub-attack.
Finally, the accurate AHGMM sub-attack improves the accuracy as compared to the optimal
kernel and almost eqivalent to the pseudo AHGMM sub-attacks. Comparatively, even under
the accurate AHGMM sub-attack, AHGMM performs better than FGB, AGB and SVGB
at these three thresholds with the least improvement at ρoj = 0.3 px/cm.
From the accurate AHGMM sub-attack, it is apparent that our AHGMM permanently
removes the sensitive information from the face and an attacker can not recognise it with
a high accuracy even when he/she has access to the secret key. This is in contrast to the
reversible filters, e.g. encryption/scrambling based filters, which can reconstruct the original
face after having the secret key. Thus, our AHGMM is robust against the brute-force attack.
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Figure 5.3: Receiver Operating Curves (ROCs) for the accurate parrot-T attack at threshold
ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. Each ROC is the mean of 10-curves generated by the 10-folds used for
cross validation. Legend: — Unprotected, — AGB, — SVGB, — FGB, —
AHGMM. In each column, the pitch angle varies from 0◦ to 70◦ in 10◦ steps from top to
bottom, while the image resolution remains same, i.e. first column (from left): 96×96 pixels,
second column: 48 × 48 pixels, third column: 24 × 24 pixels and fourth column: 12 × 12
pixels. The legend values represent the Area Under Curve (AUC).
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Figure 5.4: Inverse filtering of protected faces at different thresholds ρoj . AGB and SVGB
protected faces can be reconstructed by inverse filtering to some extent. Inverse filtering
of AHGMM protected faces is hardly possible even if the hopping kernel parameters are
known.
5.1.4 Inverse Filter Attack
In the inverse-filter (IF) attack, we reconstruct the probe images by deconvolving the pro-
tected face with an accurate or estimated kernel. We evaluate the IF attack under four sub-
attacks: optimal kernel na¨ıve-IF sub-attack, pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-IF sub-attack, accurate
AHGMM na¨ıve-IF sub-attack and accurate AHGMM parrot-IF sub-attack. Figure 5.4 de-
picts the effect of inverse filtering on selected sample images protected with AGB, SVGB
and AHGMM. Figure 5.5 shows the achieved accuracies under the different sub-attacks
at different values of ρoj , while Figure 5.6 presents few ROCs for the accurate AHGMM
parrot-IF sub-attack at ρoj = 0.5 px/cm.
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the face reconstruction quality decreases when the threshold
increases (increasing the filter kernel) even if the filter parameters are known. This is true for
both space invariant Gaussian blur (AGB) and linear space variant Gaussian blur (SVGB).
The main reason is that the boundaries of the face start propagating towards the center
of the face as the threshold is decreased. Thus, it becomes difficult to distinguish between
reconstructed faces at the lower thresholds (see Figure 5.5).
In case of non-linear space variant blur (AHGMM), the reconstruction becomes more chal-
lenging even when the same hopping kernels are used as for the protection. The main
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Figure 5.5: Face verification accuracy ηv achieved by an inverse filter (IF) attack on images
protected by four different privacy protection filters at different thresholds ρoj : first row:
ρoj = 0.7 px/cm, second row: ρ
o
j = 0.6 px/cm, third row: ρ
o
j = 0.5 px/cm. The filled
marker shows the mean and the vertical bar indicates the standard deviation of ηv for the
multi-resolution images (96 × 96, 48 × 48, 24 × 24, 12 × 12). Legend: — AHGMM,
— AGB, — SVGB, — FGB. The IF attack is investigated under four sub-
attacks: optimal kernel na¨ıve-IF, pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-IF, accurate AHGMM na¨ıve-IF
and accurate AHGMM parrot-IF attack. The AHGMM achieves a slightly higher ηv under
the na¨ıve-IF attacks than the state-of-the-art filters, independently of the used threshold
ρoj . In contrast, AHGMM achieves the lowest ηv under the parrot-IF attack. As ηv is close
to 0.5 under the na¨ıve-IF attack for 0.5 ≤ ρoj ≤ 0.7 px/cm, we therefore do not perform
experiments for ρoj < 0.5 px/cm.
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Figure 5.6: Receiver Operating Curves (ROC) for the accurate parrot-IF attack at threshold
ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. Each ROC is the mean of 10-curves generated by the 10-folds used for
cross validation. Legend: — Unprotected, — AGB, — SVGB, — FGB, —
AHGMM. In each column, the pitch angle varies from 0◦ to 70◦ in 10◦ steps from top to
bottom, while the image resolution remains same, i.e. first column (from left): 96×96 pixels,
second column: 48 × 48 pixels, third column: 24 × 24 pixels and fourth column: 12 × 12
pixels. The legend values represent the Area Under Curve (AUC).
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reason, in addition to the boundary propagation, is that while deconvolving a sub-region,
the IF incorrectly treats the adjacent subregions as if they were filtered with the same
kernel, thus not enabling it to reconstruct the original face (see Fig 5.4). Consequently, it
becomes difficult to accurately predict the label of the reconstructed face.
In contrast to na¨ıve-IF attacks, parrot-IF attack is more severe and increases significantly
the accuracy, especially for AGB, FGB and SVGB. AHGMM also shows the accuracy
improvement but less than AGB, FGB and SVGB, and is more robust to an inverse filter
attack even when using an accurate secret key.
5.1.5 Super-resolution Attack
In this attack, we reconstruct the filtered probe images with SRCNN [22]. SRCNN first
learns a mapping between the high-resolution images and their corresponding low-resolution
version, and then applies this mapping to enhance the details of a low-resolution image. We
learn the SRCNN mapping for 1, 000, 000 iterations between the protected images (i.e. the
low resolution) and their corresponding unprotected images (i.e. the high resolution) using
the same data sets (91-images and Set5) as used in [22]. As learning of the mapping is a
time consuming process, we investigate the super-resolution attack for a single point of our
synthetic data set: 12000 images each with 96× 96 pixels and 0◦ pitch angle.
We evaluate the super-resolution (SR) attack under four sub-attacks: optimal kernel na¨ıve-
SR sub-attack, pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-SR sub-attack, accurate AHGMM na¨ıve-SR sub-
attack and accurate AHGMM parrot-SR sub-attack. Tab. 5.2 summarises the achieved
accuracies under the different sub-attacks, while Figure 5.7 presents the ROC for the accu-
rate AHGMM parrot-SR sub-attack. Figure 5.8 depicts a visual comparison of the super-
resolution reconstruction for three sample faces protected by AGB, SVGB and AHGMM
filters.
For the space invariant Gaussian blur (AGB), it is apparent from Figure 5.8 that the SR
attack can reconstruct the faces more effectively, even when the kernel size is quite high
(i.e. ρoj = 0.5 px/cm). Therefore, the faces protected by AGB achieves a higher accuracy
(see Tab. 5.2). In contrast, faces protected by linear space variant Gaussian blur (SVGB)
are difficult to reconstruct. The main reason is that the SR mapping becomes erroneous
especially for patches which contain parts processed by different kernels. However, SR can
effectively reconstruct patches where the Gaussian blur is locally invariant (e.g. compare
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Table 5.2: Face verification accuracy ηv after a super-resolution attack on faces protected
by adaptive Gaussian blur (AGB), space variant Gaussian blur (SVGB) and AHGMM at
threshold ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. The values of ηv are given as µ˜(σ˜), where µ˜ indicates the mean
and σ˜ the standard deviation for the 10-fold cross validations. In the na¨ıve-SR attack, the
reconstructed probe faces are compared against the unprotected gallery images, while both
the probe and the gallery images are super-resolved in the parrot-SR attack.
Attack type AGB SVGB AHGMM
optimal na¨ıve-SR 0.592 (0.012) 0.566 (0.016) 0.515 (0.014)
pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-SR – – 0.520 (0.006)
accurate AHGMM na¨ıve-SR – – 0.532 (0.018)
accurate AHGMM parrot-SR 0.634 (0.015) 0.583(0.034) 0.546 (0.018)
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Figure 5.7: Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) for the accurate AHGMM parrot-SR attack
at threshold ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. Each ROC is the mean of 10-curves generated by the 10-folds
used for cross validation. Legend: — Unprotected, — AGB, — SVGB, —
AHGMM. This test is performed only for a single resolution (96×96 pixels) and pitch anfle
(0◦). The legend values represent the Area Under Curve (AUC).
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Original
AGB SVGB AHGMM
filtered restored filtered restored filtered restored
optimal pseudo accurate
Figure 5.8: Visual comparison of reconstructed faces with super-resolution algorithm SR-
CNN [22] for threshold ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. Reconstruction performance deteriorates from
AGB over SVGB to AHGMM protected faces.
the areas around eyes of the SVGB restored faces in Figure 5.8). The overall reconstruction
is worse than for AGB and thus the achieved accuracy is lower.
Reconstruction by super-resolution is even more challenging for AHGMM protected faces.
The main reason is that a single patch for learning the mapping contains several sub-regions
each filtered with pseudo-randomly correlated Gaussian mixture models. Thus, the error
in the learned SR mapping increases resulting in the lowest accuracy as compared to AGB
and SVGB.
Similarly to parrot-IF attack, the accuracy improves for the parrot-SR attack where SR-
reconstruction is also performed for the gallery images. Especially for AGB and SVGB, the
similarity between (protected and reconstructed) gallery images and the (reconstructed)
probe images increases. Thus, the accuracy increases. As for the other attacks, AHGMM
is more robust to parrot attacks than AGB and SVGB, and achieves the lowest accuracy.
5.1.6 Distortion Analysis
We measure the distortion of the FGB, SVGB, AGB and AHGMM using PSNR. For a
trade-off analysis between distortion and privacy, we plot the face verification accuracy
against PSNR. The results of this trade-off analysis are presented in Figure 5.9.
AGB has the highest average PSNR values followed by SVGB, AHGMM and FGB. The
Chapter 5: Experimental Results 71
10 15 20
0.5
0.55
0.6
(a)
10 15 20
0.5
0.55
0.6
(b)
10 15 20
0.5
0.55
0.6
(c)
10 15 20
0.5
0.55
0.6
(d)
10 15 20
0.5
0.55
0.6
(e)
10 15 20
0.5
0.55
0.6
(f)
10 15 20
0.5
0.55
0.6
(g)
10 15 20
0.5
0.55
0.6
(h)
Figure 5.9: Trade-off analysis between the face verification accuracy ηv and the distortion
provided by the different privacy filters under the na¨ıve-T, parrot-T and inverse filter (IF)
attacks at threshold ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. The distortion is measured by the Peak Signal to Noise
Ratio (PSNR). Legend: — AHGMM, — AGB, — SVGB, — FGB. Under
the na¨ıve-T attack, our proposed AHGMM possesses ηv almost equivalent to the state-of-
the-art filter, but lowest under the parrot-T attacks. However, AHGMM has slightly lower
PSNR as compared to AGB and SVGB, but much higher than FGB. (a) na¨ıve-T attack,
(b) accurate AHGMM parrot-IF attack, (c) optimal kernel na¨ıve-IF attack, (d) optimal
kernel parrot-T attack, (e) pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-IF attack, (f) pseudo AHGMM parrot-T
attack, (g) accurate AHGMM na¨ıve-IF attack and (h) accurate AHGMM parrot-T attack.
For the last three na¨ıve-IF and parrot-T attacks, the results of AGB, SVGB and FGB are
the same and have been superimposed for the comparison. Please see Section 5.1.2, Section
5.1.3 and Section 5.1.4 for the details of the attacks.
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Figure 5.10: Setup for the collection of a probe video data set. The subject moves from a
distance of 26 m to 2 m towards the camera, which is positioned at 7 m and at 4 m height.
The variation of the pitch angle, θP , is about 20
◦-78◦ from the Nadir direction N .
main reason is that AGB uses a single anisotropic kernel instead of spatially linearly varying
kernel used by SVGB. Although AHGMM also uses an anisotropic kernel like AGB, the
spatial hopping phenomena of the Gaussian mixture model of the AHGMM results in high
distortion (PSNR values) as compared to AGB and SVGB (see Figure 4.5). FGB has the
highest distortion as it does not change its parameters depending upon the resolution of
the face.
5.2 Experimental Results for Videography
In this section, to highlight the effect of temporal smooting (Section 4.4), the proposed
AHGMM filter is split into two filters: AHGMMp and AHGMMv. The only difference
between AHGMMp and AHGMMv is that the former does not use a temporal smoothing
filter (same as used for the photography experiments presented in Section 5.1), while the
later exploits a temporal smoothing filter.
5.2.1 Setup
We captured an Ultra-HD video probe data set with a GoPro5 camera mounted with a cus-
tom lens (25 mm) using the set up shown in Figure 5.10. For training, we captured an HD
video gallery indoor data set with the built-in camera of a Lenovo K5 smart phone ensuring
pitch angle variation of 10◦ − 90◦ degrees. There were 11 subjects in both data sets with
only frontal faces. We extracted 7944 and 399 key-frames from the probe and gallery video
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data sets, respectively, using the algorithm in [136], followed by manual post-processing
to remove frames affected by motion blur. We preprocessed all key-frames by equalizing
illumination, smoothing noise with a bilateral filter, aligning by an affine transformation
using eye centres and finally applying elliptical masking to remove non-facial parts.
We compare AHGMMv filter with AHGMMp, AGB(see Section 3.2) and SVGB [47]. Both
AHGMMp and AHGMMv are based on non-linear space variant Gaussian blur and use hop-
ping Gaussian kernels, SVGB is a linear space-variant Gaussian blur that linearly reduces
the kernel size while filtering a face, AGB is a space invariant Gaussian blur and uses a
single Gaussian kernel. AGB is regarded as a flicker-free filter.
We evaluate all the filters under a na¨ıve-T, parrot-T, pseudo na¨ıve-SR and pseudo parrot-SR
attacks. Training the super-resolution embeddings for each frame is a very time consuming
process and also there is a very small difference between the pseudo and accurate super-
resolution attacks (See Table 5.2), we therefore only perform pseudo na¨ıve-SR and pseudo
parrot-SR attacks for videography experiments. We use the SRCNN [22] super-resolution
algorithm for na¨ıve-SR and parrot-SR attacks. We use the OpenFace [134] face recognizer
to evaluate the privacy protection performance of a probe face video. OpenFace extracts a
128-dimensional feature vector for each frame using a deep Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) and then uses a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier [135].
As privacy metric, we use cumulative rank-n identification accuracy ηi defined by Eq. 1.6.
To measure fidelity, we use the PSNR that calculates the power ratio of the original frame
with respect to the filtered frame in a video (see Eq. 1.1).
We measure flicker through subjective as well as objective evaluation. For the objective
evaluation, we use the maximum of absolute difference ξ of pixel intensities defined by
Eq. 1.3.
5.2.2 Parameter Selection
The value of αt depends on the threshold ρ
o
j and the face movement. We evaluated the
effect of αt on the resulting flicker with different values of ρ
o
j on the detected faces in a
video (Figure 5.11). The flicker of AHGMMv depends on αt and on ρ
o
j , with a higher
variation at larger values of αt. To achieve a flicker equal or less than AGB, αt needs to be
selected adaptively depending upon ρoj , e.g. at ρ
o
j = 0.6 px/cm, an αt ∈ {0, 0.5} is selected
depending upon the face motion.
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Figure 5.11: Flicker ξ of (a) AGB at different thresholds ρoj and of (b) AHGMM
v at different
values of the smoothing factor αt and ρ
o
j . ξ of AGB increases with ρ
o
j . In contrast, ξ of
AHGMMv depends on both αt and ρ
o
j , and it negligibly increases with ρ
o
j , especially for low
value of αt; but significantly increases for high values of αt.
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Figure 5.12: Rank-n identification accuracy, ηi, for privacy filters under na¨ıve, parrot,
na¨ıve-SR and parrot-SR attacks at threshold ρoj = 0.6 px/cm (first row) and ρ
o
j = 0.4
px/cm (second row). The filled marker shows the mean and the vertical bar the stan-
dard deviation of ηi for the multi-resolution frames. Legend: — Unprotected, —
AHGMMv, — AHGMMp, — AGB, — SVGB. AHGMMv and AHGMMp have
the highest robustness against attacks (behaviour similar to a random classifier), especially
under parrot and parrot-SR attacks.
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Figure 5.13: Relationship between rank-n identification accuracy, ηi, and fidelity, PSNR,
for privacy filters under a na¨ıve, parrot, na¨ıve-SR and parrot-SR attacks at threshold ρoj =
0.6 px/cm (first row) and ρoj = 0.4 px/cm (second row). The filled marker shows the
mean of ηi and PSNR, the vertical bar indicates the standard deviation of ηi and the
horizontal bar indicates the standard deviation of PSNR for the multi-resolution frames.
Legend: — AHGMMv, — AHGMMp, — AGB, — SVGB. AHGMMv leads
to a slightly higher fidelity than AHGMMp, due to temporal smoothing. SVGB uses the
smallest Gaussian kernels for the outer parts of a face and leads to the highest value but
with lower privacy protection.
5.2.3 Privacy Attacks
Figure 5.12 shows the results with the unprotected probe faces as the baseline and for
a na¨ıve, parrot, na¨ıve-SR and parrot-SR attacks. Under the na¨ıve attack, AHGMMv and
AHGMMp maintain the highest privacy (i.e. ηi comparable to a random classifier) even with
ρoj = 0.6 px/cm where AGB and SVGB gives ηi larger than a random classifier. AHGMM
v
achieves almost the same robustness as AHGMMp against a parrot, na¨ıve-SR and parrot-SR
attack and it is unaffected by temporal smoothing. In contrast, AGB and SVGB filtered
faces have lower privacy protection (i.e. larger ηi).
5.2.4 Fidelity analysis
Figure 5.13 shows the trade-off between ηi of a filter under different attacks and the cor-
responding fidelity. AHGMMv has a slightly higher fidelity than AHGMMp with almost
similar values of ηi. This slightly increased fidelity is due to temporal smoothing which also
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Figure 5.14: Relationship between rank-n identification accuracy, ηi, and flicker, ξ, for
privacy filters under na¨ıve, parrot, na¨ıve-SR and parrot-SR attacks at threshold ρoj = 0.6
px/cm (first row) and ρoj = 0.4 px/cm (second row). The filled marker shows the mean of
ηi and ξ, and the vertical and the horizontal bar indicate the standard deviation of ηi and
ξ, respectively, for the multi-resolution frames. The larger ξ (see Eq. 1.3) the stronger the
flicker. Legend: — AHGMMv, — AHGMMp, — AGB, — SVGB. AHGMMv
has a much lower than AHGMMp and is similar to AGB and SVGB without any decrease
in ηi, thus improving the trade-off between ηi and ξ.
minimise spatial distortion created by the switching kernels. In contrast, SVGB has the
highest fidelity at the cost of lowest privacy (larger ηi), followed by AGB. The main reason
of higher fidelity and lower privacy of SVGB compared to AGB is due to the outer parts
of a face processed by smaller Gaussian kernels as SVGB linearly decrease the kernel size.
In summary, AHGMMv slightly improves fidelity while still robustly protecting the faces
against different attacks.
5.2.5 Flicker Analysis
Objective Evaluation
Figure 5.14 depicts the trade-off between ηi of a filter under different attacks and the corre-
sponding flicker measured using Eq. 1.3. The flicker generated by AHGMMv is significantly
lower than AHGMMp with almost the same values of ηi for any threshold ρ
o
j . This lower
flicker is the result of averaging of the frames with decaying weights that temporally reduce
the effect of pseudo-random switching of the Gaussian kernels. In contrast, although SVGB
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Figure 5.15: Subjective evaluation results. The bars indicate the mean (the larger the
value, the more frequently videos processed by a method were chosen because of a better
smoothness); the vertical lines represent the standard deviation.
and AGB have flicker similar to AHGMMv, SVGB and AGB lead to ηi values (i.e. lower
privacy). Comparatively, the flicker of SVGB is slightly greater than that of AGB, due to
linear variation of the Gaussian kernels. AHGMMv lowers flicker while being robust against
the nav¨ıe, parrot, nav¨ıe-SR and parrot-SR attacks.
Subjective Evaluation
We finally evaluate flicker with a set of 20 human observers: 14 males and 6 females, aged
between 25-35 years and without any image or video processing experience. We selected
three videos captured with three different pitch angles/scales, and filter them with the four
privacy filters: AGB, SVGB, AHGMMp, and AHGMMv (see Figure 5.16 and Figure 5.17).
We paired the four filtered versions of each video, thus generating six combinations. The
observers were asked to select the smoother video for each pair. Figure 5.15 shows the results
of this subjective evaluation: AHGMMv improves smoothness compared to AHGMMp, but
is less smooth than AGB and SVGB. This may be caused by small jerking in case of
significant face movements and by the adaptation of αt for maintaining the dynamics of the
motion of the face.
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Figure 5.16: Sample frames from the videos used in the subjective evaluation.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 5.17: Face regions used in the subjective evaluation. (a) unprotected regions. Re-
gions filtered with (b) AGB, (c) SVGB, (d) AHGMMp and (e) AHGMMv.
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5.3 Summary
This chapter evaluated the validity of the AHGMM for both photography and videography
scenarios using a state-of-the-art face recognition algorithm. For the photography scenario,
the chapter used a synthetic face data set with faces at different pitch angles and resolutions
emulating faces as captured from an MAV, while for the photography scenario it exploited
a small real data set. It is found that the proposed algorithm provides the highest privacy
under a parrot attack, an inverse-filter attack and a super-resolution attack. Moreover,
a temporal smoother does not affect robustness against various attacks. This smoothness
constraint slightly increases fidelity and significantly decreases the flicker.
Unlike face-de-identification approaches ([12, 40, 41, 44, 91, 92, 95]), the AHGMM does
not depend on a sophisticated detector (i.e. pose, facial expression, age, gender, race) to
counter parrot, inverse-filter and super-resolution attacks. Moreover, unlike the encryp-
tion/scrambling filters ([19, 20, 30, 31, 48, 73, 74, 76, 83–85]), the AHGMM prevents the
recovery of the original face even with access to the seed of the PRNG.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis by presenting its key contributions and limitations. More-
over, it discusses directions of future research areas.
6.1 Summary
In this thesis, the following contributions in the field of visual privacy protection are pre-
sented:
First, the thesis critically reviewed privacy filters intended for both fixed and mobile cam-
eras. Specifically, it stated requirements of a privacy filter (i.e. robustness against differ-
ent attacks, minimal spatio-temporal distortion and computational simplicity) for airborne
recreational videography. Furthermore, it highlighted the limitations of the existing state-
of-the-art privacy filters.
Second, the thesis presented the concept of a privacy design space for adaptive privacy
filtering to minimise spatial distortion. Although any adaptive privacy filter (e.g. pixelation,
Gaussian blur, scrambling, warping and morphing) could exploit it, evaluation using a
Gaussian blur was performed that showed the fidelity improvement while exhibiting the
same privacy level as provided by a fixed filter (na¨ıve attack only).
Third, the thesis presented a novel privacy filter AHGMM for recreational photography
that showed robustness not only against a na¨ıve attack but also a brute force attack, a
parrot attack and a reconstruction attack. Also, it minimised spatial distortion compared
to a fixed filter.
Fourth, the thesis updated the AHGMM for videography by concatenating a temporal low
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pass filter to minimise flicker. Experimental results showed that the temporal low pass filter
significantly reduced flicker without losing robustness against different attacks.
Fifth, the thesis presented a synthetically generated face image data set of 480,000 faces
belonging to 4281 subjects, emulating faces captured from 40 different positions, i.e. change
of resolution and pitch angles. Moreover, the thesis also presented a small UHD face video
data set of 11 subjects with a pitch angle variation of 20◦ - 78◦ and a height variation of
4 m - 7 m.
6.2 Future Directions
6.2.1 Limitations
The main limitation of both the privacy design space for adaptive filtering and the proposed
AHGMM filter is their dependency on an experimentally determined threshold which needs
to be calculated for each main-identifier using its state-of-the-art recognition algorithm. In
future, if there is a more powerful recognition algorithm, then an update to the threshold
is required. It is not known yet how to make the AHGMM or other adaptive privacy filters
independent of such a threshold, but it is an important aspect to focus in future.
The second limitation of both the privacy design space for adaptive filtering and the pro-
posed AHGMM filter is the assumption that the navigation sensors’ data with high precision
is available. In the thesis, this data was analytically calculated without using the actual
navigation sensors. Thus, in future, it is important to investigate the effect of using actual
navigation sensors’ data, instead of analytical one by capturing a multi-modal face data set.
Finally, it is assumed that detection of the main-identifiers in each frame is given which
may not be true practically due to wrong-detections or miss-detections. One possible way
to minimise such wrong-detections or miss-detections could be to exploit the navigation
sensors’ data. For this purpose, a captured image can be divided into different sub-regions
each with a prior knowledge of pixel density estimated using the navigation sensors’ data.
Consequently, through the Bayesian relation, the probability of wrong-detections or miss-
detections for each sub-region can be minimised. Possibly, it could also improve true-
detections.
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6.2.2 Non-facial Identity Protection
The thesis only focused on protecting the main-identifiers and specifically used faces for the
evaluation of the proposed privacy filters. Although the proposed filter is equally applicable
to the other main-identifiers, e.g. vehicle licence plates and glass windows of private houses,
it is first required to benchmark (i.e. threshold) corresponding state-of-the-art algorithms
to claim privacy protection. Moreover, as indicated in Chapter 2, identity may leak form
quasi-identifiers, e.g. age, gender, race, clothes type, clothes colour, location and time of
an individual, this is one of the future research areas. Specifically, either by exploiting the
existing state-of-the-art privacy filters or working from scratch, processing pipelines should
be devised to achieve an ideal privacy filter, i.e. a machine algorithm that conceals both
main-identifiers and quasi-identifiers.
6.2.3 Contextual Integrity
Both pre-possessing and post-processing privacy filters only ensure privacy protection within
a given context. However, if there is a movement of individuals from one context to another
(i.e. more often in airborne cameras), then identity may leak from the sensitive-regions even
protected by an ideal privacy filter. Let IR and INR be the values of I in the restricted
area (private homes) and non-restricted area (public place), respectively. Furthermore, let
both IR and INR be made close to zero by applying a privacy filter, e.g. blanking out the
restricted area and applying an ideal privacy filter for a detected individual in the non-
restricted area. Now, consider an individual in a non-restricted area, who after some time
enters in a restricted area. This entrance increases his/her identity level as very few people
are authorised to enter the restricted area. Identity level obtained from this transition can be
associated with a sensitive information revealed in the non-restricted area and consequently,
there will be a privacy loss. The same applies for exiting a restricted area. Thus, in order
to protect privacy, some mechanism should be adopted to maintain contextual integrity
during such transitions between different areas.
Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Face Image Data Set
Figure A.1 shows sample images of the stages of the dataset generation pipeline. We fit a
3D Morphable Model (3DMM) [137] on an input image to detect 68 facial landmarks [138]
and then iteratively fit a 3DMM to generate a 3D image representation1. As there may
be only a few degrees pitch of the subject captured in the images (e.g. a person looking
slightly downward or upward), we rotate the 3D image at 0◦ pitch by applying a geometric
transformation computed from the estimated pose of the fitted 3DMM. This disturbs the
image alignment of the original data set, so a realignment is required, which we perform
after generating the pitch effect. The synthetic pitch angles start from 0◦ to 70◦ with a step
size of 10◦ and project it back to generate a corresponding 2D image. In order to align this
image so that the eyes and nose appear at the same place among the images belonging to
the same pitch angle, we apply an affine transformation computed by detecting eyes and
nose tip using Dlib library [139] such that the transformed face has a resolution of 96× 96
pixels. As the detection accuracy of the eyes and nose decrease with increasing pitch angle,
we generate a ground truth (location of eyes and nose tip) of the 0◦ pitch angle images and
uses it for the higher pitch angle images.
Finally, to introduce different height effects for the 8 synthetically generated images, we
down-sample them with a factor of 2, 4, 8 and 16 generating images of 48 × 48, 24 × 24,
1Among the 12000 images, the landmark detector [138] was unable to detect 68 facial landmarks on 74
images. Therefore, we were unable to fit a 3DMM and used the original 74 images in order to comply with
the standard verification test script of the LFW data set.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure A.1: Sample images at different stages during the data set generation process. (a)
Original image 250× 250 pixels, (b) image after fitting a 3D morphable model at 0◦ pitch
angle, (c) image with synthetic pitch effect produced by applying a 3D geometric transfor-
mation, (d) aligned image of 96× 96 pixels produced by applying an affine transformation
computed by detecting eyes and nose location and (e) down-sampled image emulating an
image captured at a different height.
12 × 12, 6 × 6 pixels, respectively. Thus, we increase the size of the original standard
verification test of the LFW data set by 40 times, i.e. from 12000 images to 480, 000 images.
Fig. A.2 shows the 40 sample images belonging to the same and different subjects.
We manually determined the values of ρh and ρv by
ρh = W/Ws, (A.1)
ρv = Wcos(γ)/Hs, (A.2)
where W is the cropped width of a face in pixels, γ = 90◦ − θs is the pitch angle of the
image and Ws and Hs are the average human face dimensions, i.e. the bitragion breadth of
15.45 cm and menton-crinion length of 20.75 cm, respectively [131].
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(a)
(b)
Figure A.2: Sample images belonging to (a) a single subject and (b) multiple subjects from
our synthetically generated airborne data set based on the LFW data set [133]. In each
row, the pitch angle varies from 0◦ to 70◦ in 10◦ steps from left to right, while the image
resolution remains same, i.e. first row: 96×96 pixels, second row: 48×48 pixels, third row:
24× 24 pixels, fourth row: 12× 12 pixels and fifth row: 6× 6 pixels.
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